Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate Injured Research Participants by Pike, Elizabeth
American Journal of Law & Medicine, 38 (2012): 7-62
© 2012 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics
Boston University School of Law
Recovering from Research: A No-Fault





n. WHY RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE COMPENSATED
FOR INJURIES 10
A. The Biomédical Research Enterprise 11
B. Historical Abuses and Current Research
Participant Protections 14
C. National Advisory Committees Consider Compensating
Injured Research Participants 17
III. CONTINUED RELIANCE ON THE TORT SYSTEM TO COMPENSATE
INJURED RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS IS MORALLY INDEFENSIBLE 23
A. Injured U.S. Participants Reeeive No
Systematic Compensation 24
B. The Tort System Poses Serious Challenges for All
Research Participants 26
C. Several Classes of Research Participants Are
Systematically Uncompensated 29
1. U.S. Participants in Federally Conducted Research 30
2. International Participants in Federally
Conducted Research 32
3. International Participants in Privately
Conducted Research 33
a. Substantive Barriers to Recovery: Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute 33
^ Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health; Research Staff
Member, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues. I am extremely thankful to have
had such thoughtful review of this Article by Seema Shah, Ben Berkman, Andy Pike, Barbara Sarshik,
Karen Rothenberg, and Lindsay Wiley. I am eternally grateful to David Vanea for his invaluable
insights. This research was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Institutes of
Health, out of the Warren G. Magnussen Clinical Center. The opinions expressed here are my own.
They do not represent any position or policy of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, the Public
Health Service, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, or the Department of
Health and Human Services.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 38 NO. 1 2012
b. Procedural Obstacle to Recovery: Forum
Non Conveniens 37
IV. NON-COMPENSATION Is AN IMPEDIMENT TO U.S. RESEARCH 39
A. The Globalization of Biomédical Research 39
B. Consensus to Compensate Among Countries
Involved in Research 39
C. Lack of Systematic Compensation Delays Important
U.S.-Sponsored Biomédical Research 42
V. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT
NO-FAULT COMPENSATION 43
A. Proposed Solutions 44
1. Modified Disclosure 44
2. Mandated No-Fault Compensation System 45
B. No-Fault Compensation Systems 47
1. Insurance/Self-Insurance Requirement 48
2. Specialty Court 49
3. Compensation Fund 51
4. Personal Insurance 53
C. Proposed Parameters 53
1. Process 54
2. Research Covered 55
3. Compensable Injuries 57
4. Types of Compensation 57
5. Cross-Border Applicability 58
6. Implementation 59
D. Response to Possible Critiques 60
1. Costs 60
2. Not Actually a Problem? 61
3. Now Is Not the Time 61
VI. CONCLUSION 62
National advisory committees have considered the obligations owed to research
participants in the event of research-related injuries. These committees have
repeatedly concluded that injured research participants are entitled to compensation
for their injuries, that the tort system provides inadequate remedies, and that the
United States should adopt no-fault compensation. But because the advisory
committees have made no concrete proposals and have taken no steps toward
implementing no-fault compensation, the United States continues to rely on the tort
system to compensate injured research participants.
This Article argues that recent legal developments and a transformation in the
global research landscape make maintaining the status quo morally indefensible and
practically unsustainable. Recent legal developments exacerbate the longstanding
difficulties associated with the tort system as a method of compensation; nearly
every injured research participant will have difficulty recovering damages, and
certain classes of injured research participants—those in federal research and those
abroad—are prevented from recovering altogether, resulting in substantial
unfairness. In the past ten years, many of the countries substantially involved in
research have mandated systematic compensation. By not mandating compensation,
the United States has become a moral outlier and risks having its noncompliant
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research embargoed by foreign ethics committees, thereby delaying important
biomédical advances.
This Article examines alternative compensation mechanisms and offers a
concrete no-fault compensation proposal built on systems already in place. The
proposed system can be implemented in the United States and countries around the
world to help harmonize various national compensation systems and to more
equitably and effectively make those injured by research whole.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1993, Participant 10, an asymptomatic carrier of Hepatitis B,
enrolled in a National Institutes of Health (NIH) clinical trial of an experimental
drug Fialuridine (FIAU), a potential wonder drug for the treatment of Hepatitis B.'
Three months into the trial, however, researchers suspected something had gone
terribly wrong. The first research participant was rushed to the hospital with organ
failure. By July 30, five of the ten research participants had died from an unforeseen
FIAU toxicity.^ Patient 10 was among the luckier of the research participants; he
was rushed to the hospital, received a liver transplant, and survived—albeit after
falling into a coma, spending four months in the hospital, and looking at a lifetime of
medication to prevent his body from rejecting the transplant.^
The FIAU experiment raised serious concerns within the research community,
and commissions were convened to evaluate the trial. A Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) committee reached conclusions that were critical of the NIH
researchers,'' but independent panels of the NIH and the Institute of Medicine—an
agency within the National Academy of Sciences—cleared the researchers of any
wrong-doing, finding that there was "no evidence of negligence or carelessness on
the part of the investigators or sponsors."^
The FIAU research was not the only biomédical research trial that made
headlines, resulted in lawsuits, and prompted increased scrutiny of research. In 1996,
Pfizer conducted research on Trovan, a potential blockbuster drug, during an
outbreak of bacterial meningitis in Kano, Nigeria. A Washington Post exposé''
published allegations of research abuses during the Trovan trial that formed the basis
of the novel The Constant Gardener^ and a headline-making lawsuit.* In 1999, Jesse
Gelsinger—an eighteen-year-old enrolled in a gene transfer experiment—died
unexpectedly because of the research intervention, resulting in a lawsuit and an
undisclosed settlement.' In 2010, Professor Susan Reverby uncovered evidence that
' See. e.g., Susan Levine, Clinical Trial Was Near-Death Experience Worth His While, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at S5.
^Id.
"* One other research participant also survived after receiving an organ transplant. Id.
* See, e.g., Edwin Chen, FDA Faults Drug Testers in Patient-Death Probe, L.A. TIMES, May 14,
1994, at A16.
^ INST. OF MED., REVIEW OF THE FIALURIDINE (FIAU) CLINICAL TRIALS 12, 152 (1995).
^ See Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Batanee, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at
Al.
^ See, e.g., Jim Edwards, Ctaim: LeCarre's "The Constant Gardener" Was Based on Pfizer
Trovan Case, CBS NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009, 9:39 PM), http://www.bnet.com/blog/drug-business/claim-
lecarre-8217s-8220the-constant-gardener-8221 -was-bascd-on-pfizer-trovan-case/653.
* See AbduUahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert, denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). The
case is discussed in more detail in Part III.C.3.
' See, e.g., EZEKIEL J. E M A N U E L ET AL., ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 369 (2003).
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between 1946 and 1948, U.S. researchers deliberately infected prisoners and mental
health patients in Guatemala with gonorrhea and syphilis to test the untreated
progression of the diseases.'" On March 16, 2011, a class-action lawsuit stemming
from this research was filed in U.S. court."
These and other cases of research injuries raised important questions about the
obligations owed to injured research participants and whether the legal system is the
appropriate mechanism to fulfill these obligations. These important questions have
not been adequately addressed. A series of national advisory committees convened
to consider the obligations owed in the event of research-related injury have
concluded repeatedly that injured research participants are entitled to compensation
for their injuries, that the tort system provides inadequate remedy, and that the
United States should consider some form of no-fault compensation.'^ But because
the advisory committees have made no concrete proposals and have taken no steps to
implement no-fault compensation, the United States continues to rely on the tort
system to compensate injured research participants.
This Article is the first to analyze the developments in the legal landscape and
the global research landscape that render continued reliance on the tort system
morally indefensible and a significant impediment to U.S. research conducted
abroad. Part II provides background on the unique aspects of biomédical research
that warrant additional protections for research participants, including no-fault
compensation for injuries. Part III argues that continued reliance by the United
States on the tort system to compensate injured research participants is morally
indefensible in light of recent legal developments. The tort system poses challenges
unique to research participants that are difficult to overcome and insurmountable for
certain classes of research participants, resulting in substantial unfairness.
Part IV argues that the U.S. policy of not compensating injured research
participants is an impediment to U.S. research conducted abroad. In the past decade,
the research enterprise has become increasingly global, and nearly every country that
sponsors, hosts, or conducts substantial amounts of research has required that injured
research participants receive systematic compensation.'-' The United States not only
is a moral outlier, but also risks having its research embargoed abroad, thereby
delaying potential medical advances. Part V argues that the United States should
implement no-fault compensation for research-related injuries. After examining a
number of solutions, this Article concludes with a proposal that satisfies the moral
obligation owed to injured research participants, more equitably and effectively
compensates those injured by research at low cost, and can be implemented globally
to harmonize various national compensation systems.
II. WHY RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR
INJURIES
Biomédical research has led to some of the most important medical advances of
the past century. Extremely serious and widespread diseases that plagued prior
generations—yellow fever, polio, measles, diphtheria, and pertussis—have been
See, e.g., Susan M. Reverby, "Normal Exposure" and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS
"Tuskegee" Doctor in Guatemala, 1946-1948, 23 J. POL'Y HIST. 6 (2011).
" Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Garcia v. Sebelius, No. l : l l - c v -
00527-RBW (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2011).
'^ See infra Part U.C.
"See Seth W. Glickman et al., Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of
Clinical Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 816, 816-17 (2009).
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almost eradicated through vaccines developed using complex and ground-breaking
research.'" Biomédical research has also given rise to insulin treatment for diabetes,
antibiotics for treating a wide variety of diseases, medication for high blood
pressure, new surgical techniques, increasingly successful treatments for cancer, and
improved treatments for AIDS.'^ As scholars have noted, "the extensive benefits that
we have come to expect from medical care undoubtedly depend upon the discoveries
of medical research."'*
But unlike medical care, which treats individual patients, biomédical research
creates generalizable knowledge to benefit future patients. Research participants
themselves are often only incidental beneficiaries." Because research requires that
individuals assume additional risk for the benefit of others, unethical researchers
have historically used participants as means to an end without regard for their safety
or well-being.
As a result of past research abuses, research today is heavily regulated with
increased participant protections. Though generally well-protected throughout the
research process, research participants are critically unprotected under U.S. law and
international ethical guidelines once research injuries occur. For four decades, U.S.
advisory committees have considered and reconsidered whether there is an
obligation to compensate research participants who become injured as a result of
participating in research.'* Despite repeated recognition of such an obligation, U.S.
advisory committees have made no concrete proposals and have taken no steps to
implement systematic compensation.'^
A. THE BIOMÉDICAL RESEARCH ENTERPRISE
Biomédical research is the study of diseases and conditions and the various
methods, drugs, and devices used to treat them.^" Biomédical research shares some
superficial similarities with medical care: both biomédical research and medical care
aim to improve health through medical interventions, and both biomédical research
and medical care are conducted by doctors in medical facilities.
But research, at its core, is fundamentally different from medical care. Medical
care is dedicated to providing individual patients with the best treatments for their
particular disease.^^ Biomédical research, by contrast, has one primary goal: the
''' See. e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Impact of Vaccines Universally
Recommended for Children—United States, 1990-1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
243,243-48(1999).
" See EMANUEL ET AL., supra note 9, at xv.
""See. e.g., Paul Litton & Franklin G. Miller, A Normative Justifiication for Distinguishing the
Ethics of Clinical Research from the Ethics of Medical Care, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 566, 568 (2005).
"See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice Doctrines Versus
Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 474, 475 (2004) ("[l]t is not the goal of any research
protocol to benefit any specified individual. That happens by good fortune, not by design.").
" See infra Part U.C.
" See infra Part II.C.
°̂ See Steven Joffe & Franklin Miller, Bench to Bedside: Mapping the Moral Terrain of Clinical
Research, 38 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 32 (2008).
'̂ Franklin G. Miller, Revisiting the Belmont Report.- The Ethical Signifiicance of the Distinction
Between Clinical Researeh and Medical Care, APA NEWSLS.: NEWSL. ON PHIL. & MED., Spring 2006,
at 10-11.
^̂  See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 17, at 475.
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creation of generalizable knowledge that can be used to benefit future patients."
Research is not conducted primarily to provide the best medical treatment for
individual research participants.^'* In fact, many elements of research—placebo-
controlled trials, random assignment to treatment arms, restricted flexibility in
adjusting dosages, restrictions on using concomitant medications—are contrary to
good medical care. ^̂  Research participants may also undergo a number of
procedures to measure study outcomes—including blood draws, biopsies, radiologie
scans, and lumbar punctures—that carry burdens or risk without any compensating
medical benefit.^^
The different aims of medical care and biomédical research give rise to different
relationships. The doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship, and patients
are entitled to rely on doctors' learned judgments.^^ Doctors, in return, owe patients
a duty of care to act in the patients' best interests.^* As is true of most fiduciary
relationships, dependency and trust permeate the doctor-patient relationship.^' As
discussed in more detail in Part II.B, the same is not entirely true of the researcher-
participant relationship. The law requires researchers to disclose potential harms of
the research, but researchers need not advise potential participants as to whether
participation is in their best interests.^" While trust and dependency may develop in
the researcher-participant relationship, these attributes are not the cornerstone of the
researcher-participant relationship.^'
The very nature of research requires that participants assume some risk of harm
for the benefit of others,''^ giving rise to a risk-beneflt profile that is often different
from that of medical care. In providing medical care, a doctor is expected to weigh
the risks and benefits of a particular intervention and prescribe a course of action
only if the benefits outweigh the risks for that particular patient?^ The same is not
true for research. In accordance with established international ethical guidelines, the
risks of research must be favorably balanced by the combined beneflt to the
individual and to society as a whole.'''' Some research that is considered routine and
ethical poses net risk to individual participants.^'
^' Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 838 (Md. 2001) ("The experiment is
driven by the investigator's dedication to the advancement of knowledge . . . ; it is also driven by
society's interest in future benefits that will flow from medical discoveries.").
"See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 20, at 40; Morreim, supra note 17, at 475 ("The goal of
research is fundamentally different. It does not aim to benefit any specific individual, but rather to
advance generalizable knowledge and thereby to benefit broader populations.").
''^ See, e.g.. Miller, supra note 21, at 10, 11.
^'' See, e.g., id. at 11.
" 5ee, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines:
Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 42-43 (2003) ("[C]ourts have felt free
to call the standard physician-patient relationship fiduciary or at least a relationship of trust and
confidence. The physician has knowledge and skills for which the patient has significant need ")
^̂  See id. at 64.
^'See, e.g., id. at 43-44 ("The result is a relationship bearing the classic loyalty duties fiduciaries
owe their beneficiaries.").
°̂ See id. at 47.
At times, the doctor and researcher roles are not as dichotomous as set forth above; for
instance, a primary care physician can enroll patients as research participants and may help conduct
the research.
See, e.g., James Childress, Compensating Injured Research Subjects: I. The Moral Argument, 6
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21, 22 (1984) (noting that research participants have "taken certain risks for
the benefit of society through the advancement of medical knowledge").
" See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 20, at 30.
"See, e.g.. Criteria for IRB Approval of Research, 45 C.F.R. § 690.11 l(a)(2) (2011) ("Risks to
subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the
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Given the potentially unfavorable risk-benefit profile, why do people agree to
participate in research? The first, and most simplistic, answer is that potential
participants may not understand this fundamental difference between research and
care. While there is empirical support for this supposition,^^ it is not the ñill answer.
A more complete answer is that individuals participate in research for a variety of
reasons, some self-interested and some altruistic. Healthy individuals may choose to
enroll in disease-specific research to help or honor a loved one who has battled the
disease, or out of gratitude for the medical advances that they have enjoyed due to
past research participation.^' Sick participants may enroll in research to obtain care
and treatment otherwise unavailable outside the research context, or to generate
knowledge about their disease that benefits future patients.'* The uninsured may
enroll in research to access care or treatment otherwise unavailable to them. ̂ '
Individuals in developing countries may enroll in research because "financial
compensation for research participation may exceed participants' annual wages, and
participation in a clinical trial may provide the only access to care for persons with
the condition under study."""* Others may choose to participate solely for the
payment that they receive for participating."" In some egregious historical cases,
participants were enrolled unknowingly and unwittingly.''^ These reasons contrast
greatly with the primary reason patients participate in medical care: to get better.
This fundamental difference between the goals of medical care and the goals of
biomédical research—treating individual patients versus creating generalizable
knowledge—manifests itself in different types of relationships (doctor-patient versus
researcher-participant), different risk-benefit profiles, and different reasons for
participating. As discussed in Part III.B, these distinctions are important in
knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result."); COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. Scis. &
THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMÉDICAL RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, guideline 8 (2002) [hereinafter CIOMS (2002)] ("Risks of
interventions that do not hold out the prospect of direct diagnostic, therapeutic or preventive benefit
for the individual must be justified in relation to the expected benefits to society."); WORLD MED.
Ass'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS § B.18 (1964) (noting that risks of research must be compared with "foreseeable
benefits to them and to other individuals or communities affected by the condition under
investigation").
^^ See, e.g.. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 838 (Md. 2001) ("[T]he price
of a bad outcome is exacted from the individual who suffers the untoward reaction, whereas the
benefit ofthe breakthrough is available to society as a whole.").
^' See sources cited infi-a note 110.
" See, e.g., Litton & Miller, supra note 16, at 569.
^^ See, e.g., id.; Ruth Macklin, The Belmont Principles of Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, APA NEWSLS.: NEWSL. ON PHIL. & MED., Spring 2006, at 5. While some research participants
fare better simply because of increased medical attention during the trial, see, e.g., Morreim, supra
note 17, at 475, there is certainly no guarantee that treatment in research will be successful. Of all
drugs tested for later FDA approval, approximately eighty percent fail. Even in the later phases of
research, randomization can mean that research participants are assigned treatment that is less
effective. See, e.g., id.
' ' See, e.g., Christine Pace, Franklin G. Miller & Marion Danis, Enrolling the Uninsured in
Clinical Trials: An Ethical Perspective, 3,\ CRITICAL CARE MED. S121, S122 (2003).
* See, e.g., Glickman et al., supra note 13, at 818.
•" For a discussion of those who make a living by participating in research, and the troubling
implications thereof, see Carl Elliott, Guinea-Pigging, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 2008, at 36.
Empirical data suggest that Phase I participants are motivated to participate in research equally by a
desire to help as by money. See Pamela R. Ferguson, Clinical Trials and Healthy Volunteers, 16 MED.
L. REV. 23, 32-34 (2008).
*^ For examples of non-consensual research, see cases cited infi-a note 146, and the Guatemala
and Tuskegee studies discussed supra in the Introduction.
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determining what obligations are owed to injured research participants and how the
legal system should fulfill those obligations."^
B. HISTORICAL ABUSES AND CURRENT RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTIONS
Although biomedieal research is responsible for a vast array of medical
advances, biomedieal research has also been a means through which horrific abuses
have been perpetrated in the name of acquiring knowledge. Nazi doctors eonducted
appalling research on prisoners without their consent."" For four deeades, the U.S.
government studied the natural progression of untreated syphilis in poor, rural,
African-American men in Tuskegee, Alabama, who thought they were receiving free
healthcare from the U.S. government."^ U.S. government agencies condueted a
number of experiments to test the effects of radiation on unknowing subjects."^ And
as was recently uncovered, between 1946 and 1948, U.S. researchers infected
prisoners and mental health patients in Guatemala with gonorrhea and syphilis to test
the progression of the diseases."^
*' See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES: THE ETHICAL AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURED SUBJECTS 89 (1982) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N] ("The focus of traditional (negligence) tort doctrine on the immediate parties
to an accident—the victim and the allegedly negligent defendant—fits the moral equation of research
injuries only imperfectly. The immediate parties—subject and investigator—encompass only one
aspect of the wider society's interest in biomedieal and behavioral research.").
*'' Prisoners were thrown into freezing water to calculate how long humans could withstand cold;
they were subjected to malaria, mustard gas, and poison; they were subjected to forced sterilization;
and they were put into pressurized chambers that resulted in either death from the pressure or
execution for brain vivisection. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution,
December 9, 1946, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE; HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION 67 passim (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1995).
*^ See, e.g., U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee - The Tuskegee Timeline,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm (last
updated June 15, 2011). Tests were conducted on 400 impoverished African-American males, and the
research continued long after penicillin was known to be an effective cure. Elaborate ruses were put in
place to keep the research participants uninformed about medical advances and their health status. The
study was not shut down until 1972, when its existence was leaked to the press, forcing the
researchers to stop in the face of public outcry. See, e.g., Shamim M. Baker, Otis W. Brawley &
Leonard S. Marks, Effects of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male, 1932 to 1972: A Closure Comes to
the Tuskegee Study, 2004, 65 UROLOGY \259passim (2005).
'"' These experiments included injecting radioactive substances into babies and pregnant women,
feeding radioactive material to mentally disabled children, and releasing radioactive materials over
U.S. cities to simulate the effects of radioactive fallout. See, e.g.. ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN
RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT (1995), available at http;//ia700402.us.archive.org/
lO/items/advisorycommitteOOunit/advisorycommitteOOunit.pdf
"^ See, e.g., Reverby, supra note 10. The U.S. government has since formally apologized for its
role in some of these experiments. See, e.g.. Remarks in Apology to African-Americans on the
Tuskegee Experiment, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 718 (May 16, 1997), available at
http;//www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1997-05-19/pdf/WCPD-1997-05-19-Pg718.pdf; Press Release,
HHS Press Office, Joint Statement by Secretaries Clinton and Sebelius on a 1946-1948 Study
(October 1, 2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/10/20101001a.html. But,
many participants received neither compensation nor acknowledgment of what had been done to them.
See, e.g., Matthew T. Lee & Jeannine A. Gailey, Attributing Responsibility for Organizational
Wrongdoing, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR AND CORPORATE CRIME 50, 62
(Henry N. Pontell c& Gilbert Geis eds., 2007).
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Because of the potential for abuse, biomédical research has become a more
tightly regulated enterprise over the past half-century.'*^ In 1947, the Nazi-era
violations gave rise to the Nuremberg Code, '*' the first generally accepted
international code governing research with human subjects. Created by a judicial
panel with input from physician advisors, the Nuremberg Code set forth the
fundamental principle that the "voluntary consent ofthe human subject is absolutely
essential."^" The Nuremberg Code also set forth other requirements for conducting
ethical research, including that research should be able to "yield fruitful results for
the good of society,"^' that research "should be conducted to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering,"^^ and that the degree of risk "should never exceed
that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the
experiment."^'
Over time, the requirements of the Nuremberg Code came to be considered
overly formalistic and infiexible, '̂* and the World Medical Association drafted a new
set of guidelines. In 1964, the World Medical Association published the Declaration
of Helsinki, a statement of ethical principles to guide physicians and other
participants in medical research that involves human subjects.^^ Although very much
in keeping with the principles of the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki
allowed research to be conducted on those incapable of providing informed consent
in certain circumstances. ^̂  The Declaration of Helsinki is widely regarded as a
cornerstone of human research ethics."
In the wake of revelations uncovered about the Tuskegee syphilis experiment in
1972, the United States turned its attention to the ethics of biomédical research
within its borders and appointed a National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomédical and Behavioral Research (the "National
Commission").^^ In 1979, the National Commission produced the Belmont Report,
which contained a set of ethical principles designed to "provide an analytical
*' See, e.g., J.V. McHale, Law and Clinical Research - From Rights to Regulation? An English
Perspective, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 718, 718 (2004) ("The last half century has been characterized by
a growth in the regulation of clinical research nationally and internationally.").
•" The Nuremburg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 44, at 2.
™W. § 1 .
" Id. § 2.
" Id. § 4.
'' Id. § 6.
^' Particularly, the seemingly absolute requirement of informed consent left little room for
experiments involving children, the mentally ill, and individuals in emergency situations. See, e.g..
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 836 (Md. 2001) ("[PJhysician groups tended to
find the Code too 'legalistic' and irrelevant to their therapeutic experiments, and set about to develop
an alternative code to guide medical researchers.") (quoting George J. Annas, Mengele 's Birthmark:
The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17, 19-21 (1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
" WORLD MED. ASS'N, supra note 34; WORLD MED. ASS'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI:
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2008), available at
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html.pdf?print-media-type&footer-
right=[page]/[toPage].
"* See WORLD MED. ASS'N, supra note 34, §11.1.
" See, e.g., Snezana Bosnjak, The Declaration of Helsinki - The Cornerstone of Research Ethics,
9 ARCHIVE ONCOLOGY 179, 180 (2001). Though the Declaration of Helsinki has its detractors, it has
also been considered the "most successful and influential" code. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 836.
'* See U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee - Research Implications, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last updated June 15,
2011).
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framework [to] guide the resolution of ethical problems arising from research
involving human subjects."'^ The National Commission's more concrete proposals,
including a focus on informed participant consent and prior ethical review by
institutional review boards (IRBs), became enshrined in federal regulations that
formed the basis of the "Basic Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects" (known
as the "Common Rule"), '̂' a rule that today governs the conduct of research
undertaken by most federal agencies.^' The Common Rule and the Belmont Report
together provide the backbone of the federal oversight system in the United States.*^
More recently, ethical guidance has focused on the globalization of biomédical
research and the concern that research may move to countries where regulation and
participant protections are more lax. In 1993, the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in collaboration with the World Health
Organization (WHO), produced the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomédical
Research Involving Human Subjects,^^ which includes additional requirements to
render international research ethical.*'* Most recently, the International Conference
on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals
for Human Use, in conjunction with the WHO, promulgated the "Good Clinical
Practice" (ICH/GCP) standards with the aim of harmonizing the regulation of
clinical trials.^^
These ethical guidelines and legal requirements have generally coalesced around
a number of important protections for research participants.^'' Research must be
scientifically valid and able to answer the question it asks; subjecting research
participants to risks is otherwise unjustifiable.*'' A trial should be allowed to proceed
only if the potential risks to participants are minimized, and if the potential benefits
to individual participants and society justify the risks.** Each participant must be
" Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomédical
and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46
(2010)).
'" See Subpart A - Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R.
pt. 46(2010).
' ' EMANUEL ET AL., supra note 9, at 27.
^̂  See, e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp, Assessing the Belmont Report, APA NEWSLS.: NEWSL. ON PHIL.
& MED., Spring 2006, at 3 (noting that the Belmont Report "is one of the few documents that has
influenced almost every sphere of activity in bioethics[,]" and its principles "became the backbone of
federal law governing research involving human subjects"). Proposed modifications to the Common
Rule have been proposed in an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. See Human Subjects
Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and
Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 46). These modifications seek to streamline the regulation of multi-site research and do not
address the issue of compensation for research-related injuries.
'^ COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS. & THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMÉDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1993) [hereinafter
CIOMS (1993)]. The guidelines were updated in 2002. CIOMS (2002), supra note 34.
" One such requirement is that researeh must be "responsive to the health needs and the
priorities of the community in which it is to be carried out." See CIOMS (2002), supra note 34, at 51.
*' See International Conference on Harmonisation; Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated
Guideline; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,692 (May 9, 1997).
* See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David Wendler & Christine Grady, What Makes Clinical
Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 2701, 2701 (2000); Markus Schott, Medical Research on Humans:
Regulation in Switzerland, the European Union, and the United States, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 69
(2005) ("One of the most striking features of the examined legal sources is the high degree of
similarity among them.").
" Emanuel, Wendler & Grady, supra note 66, at 2704.
^^ Id. at 2705.
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given sufficient information about the research to "make a voluntary and uncoerced
decision whether to participate," though exceptions exist for children and individuals
otherwise unable to give consent.*' Research proposals must be submitted and
reviewed in advance by a research ethics committee with authority to prevent trials
that do not satisfy these ethical requirements from going forward.^" And research
participants must be allowed to stop participating at any time.
Despite the proliferation of guidance documents, a serious gap in ensuring
research participant protection remains. These guidance documents are, for the most
part, silent about obligations owed to research participants once injury occurs.^'
Regardless of how tightly regulated the research enterprise is, injuries will still
occur; merely informing participants about potential future injuries provides little
comfort once injuries do occur. Two organizations—CIOMS and the Institute of
Medicine—have taken the lead in recommending that injured research participants
receive compensation.'^ But as long as the issue of compensating injured research
participants remains unaddressed under U.S. law, a critical gap in research
participant protection remains.
C. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES CONSIDER COMPENSATING INJURED
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
For nearly forty years, U.S. national advisory committees have considered
whether there is an obligation to compensate injured research participants. These
committees have concluded repeatedly that compensating injured research
participants is morally required, and that the tort system is inadequate to ensure
compensation. '̂  But, these advisory committees have put forth no concrete
proposals, and have taken no steps to implement systematic compensation.^'' The
changing legal and global research landscapes render further inaction morally
indefensible and an impediment to the research enterprise.
Although the issue of compensating injured research participants was
considered by the U.S. government as far back as 1940,^' the first national advisory
committee to address the issue was a 1973 ad hoc panel created by the Department
" Id at 2706.
™See Criteria for IRB Approval of Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 ll(a) (2010) (noting that IRBs
ensure that risks to subjects are minimized, that risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to
anticipated benefits, that selection of subjects is equitable, and that informed consent is sought and
documented). In many institutions, research is subject to scientific review by a committee tasked with
ensuring sufficient scientific merit. See, e.g.. Scientific Review Committees, AM. HEALTH ASSISTANCE
FOUND., http://www.ahaf.org/aboutahaf/structure/src.html (last updated Sept. 23, 2011). Trials are
subject to continuing review of adverse events and interim findings. See IRB Review of Research, 45
C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2010). Many trials are also reviewed by data monitoring committees that monitor
incoming data and assess patient safety and efficacy of the intervention while the trial is ongoing.
•" See generally supra notes 49, 55, 59, 60, 65; CIOMS (1993), supra note 63.
" See CIOMS (2002), supra note 34, at 78 ("Investigators should ensure that research subjects
who suffer injury as a result of their participation are entitled to free medical treatment for such injury
and to such financial or other assistance as would compensate them equitably for any resultant
impairment, disability or handicap."); INST. OF MED., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 193 (2002) ("Organizations conducting research
should compensate any research participant who is injured as a direct result of participating in
research, without regard to fault.").
"See infra note 112.
'" See in/ra note 112.
" In the 1940s, the Army debated, but ultimately rejected, suggestions to compensate prisoner
volunteers injured during malaria and hepatitis experiments. ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN
RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46, at 827.
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of Health, Education, and Welfare to review the Tuskegee syphilis study.'^ Several
subsequent committees—including the 1977 Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare Task Force on the Compensation of Injured Research Subjects;''the 1978
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomédical and
Behavioral Research;'* the 1982 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomédical and Behavioral Research (the "1982
President's Comission"); " the 1995 Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments;*" and the 2001 National Bioethics Advisory Commission*'—have also
considered the issue. The issue of compensating injured research participants was
most recently addressed in 2011 by the Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues.*^
These committees repeatedly found a moral obligation to compensate injured
research participants,*'' concluding that those "who are harmed as a result of
participating in research ought to receive some compensation for their injuries,"*"*
and that a mechanism to compensate injured research participants "has long been
justified on ethical grounds."*' Alan Weisbard, an attorney who served with the 1982
President's Commission, noted the "obvious intuitive justice and rightness of taking
care of those who volunteered to undergo risky procedures for the common good,
and through no fault of their own—or of anyone else—were seriously injured in the
process."*^ This intuition was best articulated as a justification for compensating
injured research participants by the 1982 President's Commission:
'"' See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
TusKEGBE SYPHILIS STUDY AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL 123 (1973), available at
http://www.research.usfedu/cs/library/docs/finalreport-tuskegeestudyadvisorypanel.pdf
" SEC'Y 'S TASK FORCE ON THE COMP. OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE (1977) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE].
" Institutional Review Boards: Report and Recommendation ofthe National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomédical and Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (Nov. 30
1978).
" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43.
*" ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46.
" NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 125 (2001).
"̂  PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL SCIENCE:
PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2011) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL
COMM'N] .
*' See, e.g.. Opening Letter to PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43 (acknowledging "the ethical
obligation toward subjects"); SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-6 ("[T]he [federal
government's] compensatory obligation extends at least to injured volunteers . . . sponsored by and for
the benefit of society as a whole.").
'* PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 1.
'*' NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 123.
'^ Alan J. Weisbard, The Role of Philosophers in the Public Policy Process: A View from the
President's Commission, 97 ETHICS 776, 780 (1987).
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Medieal and scientific experimentation, even if carefully condueted,
carries certain inherent dangers. Experimentation has its victims,
people who would not have suffered injury and disability were it not
for society's desire for the fruits of researeh. Society does not have the
privilege of asking whether this priée should be paid; it is being paid.
In the absence of a program of eompensation of subjects, those who
are injured bear both the physical burdens and the associated financial
costs. The question of justice is why it should be those persons, rather
than others, who are to be expected to absorb the financial, as well as
the unavoidable human eosts of the societal researeh enterprise which
benefits everyone.^'
These committees, along with bioethics commentators, have argued forcefully
that compensating injured researeh participants is justified by principles of: (1)
distributive justice; (2) compensatory justice; (3) internalization of true eosts; and
(4) the need to maintain trust in the research enterprise.^^
The first Task Foree that considered the issue concluded that compensating
injured research participants was a matter of distributive justice, an obligation to
distribute the benefits and burdens of researeh equitably. ̂ ' Prior to beginning a
researeh trial, sponsors of researeh are able to determine whether the foreseeable
benefits of research outweigh the burdens.'" Research participants are less well-
equipped to make this determination.'' As discussed below, participants are less able
to understand the risks and benefits of research and eannot know certain
information, e.g., that they will be among the small percentage of research
participants who will be injured by the research. Shifting benefits from those who
are ensured an appropriate benefit to those who have been unexpectedly and
disproportionately burdened by injury satisfies the dictates of distributive justice.
The 1977 Task Foree also argued that compensation should be provided as a
matter of compensatory justice, an obligation to make whole one you have injured.'^
Compensatory justice requires that an attempt be made to restore injured researeh
participants to their previous condition. ^^ The obligation can be satisfied by
providing medical care when it is possible to restore injured persons to their
previous state, or by monetary eompensation when literal restoration is not feasible.
*' PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 50.
** See, e.g., SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI.
*' See, e.g., id. (noting that the "principle of distributive justice" could justify compensating
injured research participants: "[S]ince society is the beneficiary of biomedieal and behavioral
research, it ought to bear the burden of biomedieal and behavioral research injuries as well"). See also
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 63 ("Thus, treatment or compensation/restitution for the
costs of treatment, is justified by distributive or corrective justice and by duties of beneficence.").
Scholars have also used the principle of distributive justice to justify compensating injured research
participants. See, e.g., David B. Resnik, Compensation for Research-Related Injuries: Ethical and
Legal Issues, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 263 (2006).
"* See Resnik, supra note 89, at 282-83.
" See id. at 282.
'^ See, e.g., SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-3 ("[S]ociety, through its
governmental agents, has intervened in the lives of the injured individuals, and therefore society may
be said to have an obligation to repair (so far as is possible) injury done to individuals . . . ."). See
also PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 63 ("Thus, treatment or compensation/restitution for
the costs of treatment, is justified by distributive or corrective justice and by duties of beneficence.").
'̂  See, e.g., SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-4 (defining compensatory justice as
the "form of justice which seeks to redress injury even when no fault or blame is associated with the
injury").
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A third justification for compensation is that it forces those conducting research,
who can best manage and mitigate the risk of injury, to internalize the true costs of
research. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel adopted Guido
Calabresi's arguments that requiring compensation for research-related injuries
"causes the ñill cost of research in humans to be placed on the research center,"
which "may cause those involved in the most risky or least useful [research] to
consider carefully whether the experiment is worth it, whether it is best done by
those who propose to do it, and whether there is an alternative, and safer, way of
obtaining approximately the same results." '̂* Requiring compensation forces
sponsors of research to weigh the true costs of research in determining what research
to conduct and what systems to put in place to best manage the associated risks.'^
Finally, the Institute of Medicine published a report in which it argued that
compensating injured research participants fosters trust in the research enterprise.
The research enterprise depends upon continued participant enrollment in research.
Forcing injured research participants to bear both the medical and financial burdens
of research-related injuries could lead to "diminished public trust in the research
community," and could lead future generations to refuse to participate in research.'^
The advisory committees have also addressed the counterargument that
compensation may not be required because research participants assume and accept
risk through the informed consent process.'^ Under this counterargument, because
research participants agree through the informed consent process to accept the
articulated risks, mandating compensation protects individuals in ways they have
decided is unnecessary.'^
Advisory committees have disputed any characterization of informed consent as
"a waiver of a moral right to compensation."^' Advisory committees have noted that
viewing the informed consent process as a waiver of a right to compensation is an
overly legalistic view of the role of informed consent. The purpose of informed
consent is to ensure that individuals control whether or not they participate in
research and that any decision to participate is voluntary and uncoerced.'°° This
'" PUB. HEALTH SERV., supra note 76, at 41-42.
" This is closely related to the economic concept of risk-spreading, that the person who can best
and most efficiently afford the costs of injury should bear them. According to Wendy Mariner,
economic theory favors shifting the costs of research-related injuries to research sponsors, who have
greater resources than individual injured research participants and can recover financial losses through
revenue-generating mechanisms. See Wendy K. Mariner, Compensation for Research Injuries, in 2
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL
STUDIES 113, 114 (Inst. of Med. ed., 1994).
•"* INST, OF MED., supra note 72, at 14-15. See also PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 61
("Potential human research subjects may be more likely to agree to serve if they know they will be
taken care of in the event that they are harmed as a direct result of their participation. In an era in
which the recruitment of adequate numbers of research subjects continues to be a major challenge, this
could be significant."). This is not an idle concern. The fallout from the Tuskegee research
experiments left wide swaths of the population unwilling to participate in research and untrusting of
the medical establishment in general. Stephen B. Thomas & Sandra Crouse Ouinn, The Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, 1932 to 1972: Implications for HIV Education and AIDS Risk Education Programs in
the Black Community, 81 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1498, 1498 (1991).
" This counterargument is also articulated in Mariner, supra note 95, at 116
'"See id.
" SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-7.
""' See, e.g., id. at VI-5 ("Informed consent in the researeh setting functions as a recognition ofa
protection for a person's integrity and autonomy, but does not imply a waiver of the right of the
person to eompensation in the event of injury."); Childress, supra note 32, at 25 ("The requirement of
consent is based on fairness and respect for the autonomy of persons."); Emanuel, Wendler & Grady,
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voluntary and uncoerced decision to participate should not act as a legal waiver,""
and, in fact, the federal research regulations expressly provide that research
participants cannot be made to waive their legal rights in the informed consent
process.'"^
Second, any argument that respect for persons' autonomous decision-making
counsels against compensating injured research participants mistakenly conflates
participants' willingness to sign informed consent documents without demanding
compensation with a preference not to receive compensation."*^ Participants may
sign informed consent documents accepting risk and foregoing compensation
because those are the terms presented to them. '"'* That does not mean that
participants prefer to go uncompensated in the event of research-related injuries; it
simply means that participants are willing to accept the terms presented,'"^ that
participants were unaware that they could negotiate for mandated compensation,'
or that participants did not realize that they may not receive compensation.'"'
Third, research participants may not actually understand the risks and benefits
that they accept by agreeing to participate in research. Research risks often include
remote possibilities of medical complications, the likelihood and consequences of
which may be difficult to assess.'"^ Research also carries the potential for unforeseen
risks to materialize such that it may be impossible for research participants to
consent to all risks of research.'"' Research participants also may misunderstand the
benefits that they receive from participating in research."" Given that participants
supra note 66, at 2706 ("Informed consent embodies the need to respect persons and their autonomous
decisions.").
"" See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 191 ("It has been argued that a participant
relinquishes his or her right to compensation when giving informed consent, but in the committee's
view, a right to compensation for research-related injury should not be subject to waiver.");
SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-5 ("[I]nformed consent does not negate or waive the
obligation to provide compensation."); Childress, supra note 32, at 25 ("[W]hile consent is a
necessary moral condition for ethically justified research in normal circumstances, . . . [i]ts presence
does not remove society's moral obligation of compensatory justice . . . ."). Regulations governing
research expressly forbid informed consent documents from requiring research participants to waive
legal rights. 5ee General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011).
'"̂  For the general requirements for informed consent, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 ("No informed
consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through which the subject or
the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights . . . .").
'"' See, e.g., SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-7 ("Volunteers for experimentation
have a reasonable interest in requiring compensation as a condition for participation in an experiment.
It is the type of debt a volunteer should require from a researcher.").
'"''5'ee NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 123-24 (noting that OHRP
provides guidance for researchers to craft noncompensatory language without running afoul of the ban
on exculpatory clauses).
"" It may also signify that participants do not fully understand their rights. Studies have shown
that the reading level of an average research participant is sixth to eighth grade; the average informed
consent document is written at a tenth grade reading level; and the section pertaining to compensation
is written at an even higher level. See Resnik, supra note 89, at 270.
"" Given that informed consent language and research procedures are approved by IRBs,
research participants may not actually have the power to negotiate for compensation.
"" The language in most informed consent documents—that participants do not surrender their
legal rights by participating in research—is confusing at best.
'"'See, e.g., G. Owen Schaefer & Alan Wertheimer, The Right to Withdraw from Research, 20
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 329, 338 (2010).
^'^ See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 123 ("[E]ven if consent
forms and the disclosures within them are comprehensive, completely unforeseen iatrogenic harms
might occur in research.").
" " A substantial proportion of participants confuse the treatment they receive in research with
that of standard medieal care. Sam Horng & Christine Grady, Misunderstanding in Clinical Research:
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may not understand the sacriflces that they make by participating in research, it is
important not to foreclose compensation in the event of research-related injuries.
Although most advisory committees have ultimately recommended systematic
no-fault compensation,'" none set forth concrete proposals or took steps toward
implementing no-fault compensation."^ Some committees also recommended a
smaller step viewed as the necessary precursor to systematic compensation: "-̂
collecting empirical data about the necessity and feasibility of compensating injured
research participants."''Progress has not been made on this front either."' Thus,
despite recognition for four decades of a moral obligation to compensate injured
research participants, the United States only requires that participants be informed as
to whether care or compensation will be available."^ Research participants may end
up being forced to choose between bearing the medical and financial costs of
research-related injuries alone ' " —in some cases with the help of their
Distinguishing Therapeutic Misconceptions, Therapeutic Misestimation & Therapeutic Optimism, 25
IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 11, 12 (2003). Despite being informed about study design implications,
including random assignment to a control or comparison group, research participants may still believe
that every aspect of research is designed for personal benefit. See, e.g., id.; Amulya Mandava et al..
Mapping the Landscape: The Data on Informed Consent, 38 J. MED. ETHICS (forthcoming 2012)
(finding substantial variation in participant understanding of research in both developing and
developed countries, particularly with regard to randomization, placebo-controlled designs, and side
effects); Litton & Miller, supra note 16, at 572.
' " See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46, at 528
("The Advisory Committee recommends . . . a mechanism for the satisfactory resolution of this long-
standing social issue."); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 123 ("A
comprehensive system of oversight of human research should include a mechanism to compensate
participants for medical and rehabilitative costs resulting from research-related injuries.");
SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at II-2 ("Human subjects who suffer physical,
psychological, or social injury . . . should be compensated . . . ."); PUB HEALTH SERV., supra note 76,
at 41 ("An insurance plan should be devised and implemented for the compensation of subjects
harmed as a consequence of their participation in research activities.").
"^ See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 70 ("The Commission recognizes that
previous presidentially appointed bioethics commissions and other duly appointed advisory bodies
have made similar recommendations regarding compensation or treatment for research-related
injuries; yet no clear response by the federal government has been issued.").
"•' See, e.g., id. at 125 (noting that the Federal Government would not implement a proposal "[i]n
the absence of a finding that a significant number of modern research subjects are unfairly denied
eompensation"); SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at I1I-2 (explaining that past no-fault
proposals had not been accepted due to a lack of data).
"* See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46, at 528
("The Advisory Committee recommends that the Human Radiation Interagency Working Group
review the area of compensation for research injuries . . . ."); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,
supra note 81, at 125 ("More information is needed about the nature and extent of researeh-related
injuries and uncompensated research injuries."); Opening Letter to PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note
43 ("To determine the need for, and practical feasibility of, a compensation program, the Commission
recommends that a small experiment be undertaken over a three to five-year period."); SECRETARY'S
TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at Vl-1 to VI-2; PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 67-69.
' " See, e.g.. ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46, at 528 ("No
policy exists even today . . . ."); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 125 ("The
availability, eircumstances, and procedures for compensating injured research participants have
remained unchanged from those observed by the Tuskegee Advisory Panel."); PuB HEALTH SERV.,
supra note 76, at 23 ("No policy for the compensation of research subjects harmed as a consequence
of their participation in research has been formulated."); PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 70.
'""See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. S 46 116(a)
(2005).
' " See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 125-26 ("[IJnjured research
participants alone bear both the cost of lost health and the expense of medical care . . . . [T]he costs of
research injuries should not be borne by the injured participants . . . .").
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insurance"*—or bringing suit to recover for their injuries in a legal system ill-
equipped to ensure adequate protection."^
In the past decade, the legal landscape and the global research landscape have
changed considerably. In light of these developments, described in Parts III and IV,
continued inaction toward compensating injured research participants has become
morally indefensible and practically unsustainable.
III. CONTINUED RELIANCE ON THE TORT SYSTEM TO COMPENSATE
INJURED RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS IS MORALLY INDEFENSIBLE
The trend in biomédical research over the past half-century has been towards
increasing protections for research participants, generally in the form of informed
consent and prior review by research ethics committees. Despite strong
philosophical justifications for requiring compensation, and recognition of a moral
obligation to compensate injured research participants by national advisory
committees, the United States has never required that injured research participants
receive compensation. '̂ " Accordingly, most research institutions do not provide
compensation, either in the form of free medical care or financial compensation,'^'
and research participants who suffer research-related injuries may be forced to bear
the medical and financial burdens of research-related injuries alone.'
Instead, the United States has continued to rely on the tort system as the primary
mechanism through which injured research participants receive compensation. As
set forth below, the tort system is a problematic mechanism for ensuring that injured
research participants receive compensation. The tort system is generally problematic
in ways that have been addressed in detail elsewhere: the tort system is time-
consuming, adversarial, expensive, and has a tendency to under-compensate most
injured participants while over-compensating a select few.'̂ ^
The tort system also poses challenges that are unique to injured research
participants, particularly when compared to injured medical patients. Injured
research participants have more difficulty than medical patients showing that a duty
owed to them was breached; that the intervention caused their injury; and that they
' " See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
' " See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 125 ("[E]ven when
warranted and successful, such lawsuits are costly and slow and thus are of limited value at the time
the injury is incurred."); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 88 ("But if research subjects should,
on ethical grounds, be compensated for their injuries, despite the lack of negligence by an
investigator, the rules of negligence law will be patently inappropriate."); SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE,
supra note 77, at V-2 ("Given the fact that the very nature of research is a venture into the unknown,
it is unlikely that harm resulting from effects that were not reasonably foreseeable would be a basis
for liability, and adequately drafted consent forms would likely obviate liability for anticipated
risks."); PUB HEALTH SERV., supra note 76, at 36-37 ("Those subjects whose injury does result from
negligence are faced with the usual difficulties and uncertainties inherent in a lawsuit.").
'•"* Sabina Gainotti & Carlo Petrini, Insurance Policies for Clinical Trials in the United States
and in Some European Countries, 1 J. CLINICAL RES. & BIOETHICS 1, 2-3 (2010).
'^' For more information about institutional compensation policies, see the discussion and data
included in supra Part II.A.
'̂ ^ See source cited supra note 117.
'̂ ^ See, e.g., iNST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 190-91; R. Ian McEwin, No-Fault Compensation
Systems, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &. ECONOMICS § 3600, at 737, 739 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 1999), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/tablebib.html; Mariner, supra
note 95, at 121; Jeffrey O'Connell, Tort Versus No-Fault: Compensation and Injury Prevention, 19
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 63 (1987) ("The attempt to achieve a fair and rational method
for the compensation of victims has been displaced by a form of litigation lottery.").
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did not, through the informed consent process, "assume the risk."'^" Injured researeh
participants are also often injured by unforeseen risks that are not anyone's fault and
so fall outside the tort system entirely.'" Additionally, as set forth below, evolving
and complex legal doctrines systematically deny access to the U.S. legal system for
researeh participants injured while participating in federal researeh and for those
participating in international research. Reeent legal developments, including two
décisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seeond Circuit'^* and a lawsuit filed
by those injured in the recently uncovered Guatemala research, '̂ ^ emphasize the
inadequacy of the tort system as a means of ensuring compensation for injured
research participants.
A. INJURED U.S. PARTICIPANTS RECEIVE NO SYSTEMATIC COMPENSATION
Current U.S. law does not require that injured researeh participants reeeive
compensation. U.S. regulations require only that participants enrolled in researeh
involving more than minimal risk receive an explanation as to whether, and to what
extent, eompensation or medical treatment will be available in the event of a
researeh-related injury.'^*
A study commissioned by the Department of Health and Human Services found
that most researeh institutions do not have formal policies to provide free eare or
compensation to injured researeh participants. '^' Of the 129 policies reviewed,
eighty-four pereent of research institutions provided no free eare or treatment to
injured researeh participants. '̂ ^ Not one of the 129 policies reviewed offered
eompensation for lost wages or pain and suffering.'^'
This is not to say that no injured research participants reeeive free medical eare
or compensation for their injuries; some institutions provide more than what is
required by law. The leader in compensating injured researeh participants is the
University of Washington, which has maintained a self-funded, no-fault
compensation plan that has provided injured researeh participants with
'̂ ^ For more information and a discussion about assumption of risk, see infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
' " See Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 2.
"'•See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v. Pfizer,
Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
' " See Reverby, supra note 10.
^^ See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6)
(2005). For institutions that will not provide compensation or treatment, the Office of Human
Research Protection suggests the following language; "This hospital makes no commitment to provide
free medical care or payment for any unfavorable outcomes resulting from participation in this
research. Medical services will be offered at the usual charge." "Exculpatory Language" in Informed
Consent, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (NOV. 15,
1996), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/exculp.html.
' " THE LEWIN GRP., TASK ORDER N O . 2: CARE/COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES IN CLINICAL
RESEARCH E S - 2 (2005).
""Id.
™ Id.; see also Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3 (discussing a study conducted by
Department of Health and Human Services that found that 51.2 percent of academic medical centers
"provided no free care to the injured subjects"); Michael K. Paasche-Orlow & Frederick L. Brancata,
Assessment of Medical School Institutional Review Board Policies Regarding Compensation of
Subjects for Research-Related Injury, 118 AM. J. MED. 175, 177 (2005) (finding that only one-half of
research participants enrolled in research at medical schools have their medical bills for research-
related injuries covered).
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reimbursement for medical costs since 1979.'^^ Other organizations, such as the
Department of Veterans Affairs,'" the NIH,'^'* and the Department of Defense,'^^
have also voluntarily agreed to provide short-term medical care for injured research
participants during the course of research trials.'^* Since 2000, Medicare has paid for
care for medical complications that result from participation in "qualifying trials"—
therapeudc trials that enroll patients rather than healthy volunteers.'" But these and
a few other institutions are the exception rather than the rule. The vast majority of
research institutions provide no medical care or financial compensation for research-
related injuries."^
Because injured research participants are not routinely provided medical care or
compensated for research-related injuries, injured research participants often bear
the medical and financial burdens of research-related injuries alone. Injured research
participants with private health insurance may seek coverage of their medical bills
through their insurer.''" But, private insurance provides only limited relief. It does
not provide compensation for financial injuries, and may not provide compensation
for injuries known to arise from experimental treatment.''*" Moreover, those who are
uninsured have no outlet for receiving systematic compensation for their injuries.''*'
"^ See Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3. Under the plan, medical expenses are covered up
to $10,000, and other expenses, including economic losses, may also be covered. For a claim to
proceed, the research participant must sign a document releasing the university from tort liability. See
id.; HUMAN SUBJECTS DIV., UNIV. OF WASH., RESEARCH CARE PLAN - POLICY SUMMARY AND
IMPLICATIONS (2008), available at http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/docs/557; see also
HUMAN SUBJECTS DIV., UNIV. OF WASH., U W COMPENSATION PLAN ADVERSE FLOW CHART (2010),
available at http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/docs/467.
' "See Treatment of Research-Related Injuries to Human Subjects, 38 C.F.R. § 17.85 (1998)
("VA medical facilities shall provide necessary medical treatment to a research subject injured as a
result of participation in a research project. . . .").
' ' ' ' See, e.g., OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, SHEET 6—
GUIDELINES FOR WRITING INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENTS H 4(S) (2006), available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/info/sheet6.html ("The Clinical Center of the NIH will provide short-term
medical care for any injury resulting from your participation in research here. In general, no long-term
medical care or financial compensation for research-related injuries will be provided . . . .").
'•'' U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6000.8: FUNDING AND
ADMINISTRATION OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION PROGRAMS H 6.2.4 (2007), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/600008p.pdf ("All CIP investigators shall . . . for
research involving more than minimal risk . . . include in every intramural (in-house) CIP protocol an
arrangement for treatment of any research-related injuries.").
'"• A discussion of these policies is presented in INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 188; THE
LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at 16-19; Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3; PRESIDENTIAL
COMM'N, supra note 82, at 65.
' " Larry D. Scott, Research-Related Injury: Problems and Solutions, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
419,421-22(2003).
''* See Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3; THE LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at app. A.
'^'See, e.g., THE LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at ES-3 ("In the absence of showing fault, in fact,
insurance serves as the primary vehicle for compensation of such injuries in the United States.").
''"' See, e.g., NAT'L CANCER INST., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Clinical Trials and Insurance
Coverage, http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/payingfor/insurance-coverage (May 8, 2009) ("Even if
you have health insurance, your plan may not cover all of the costs related to receiving treatment in a
clinical trial. This is because some health insurance companies define clinical trials as
'experimental.'").
" ' This situation will change as additional provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act come into force. Under section 10103(c) ofthe Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
requirements are imposed on group health plans and health insurance issuers to provide for coverage
of routine patient costs associated with approved clinical trials. The provision does not address
research-related injuries. See Healthcare Reform Law May Impact Clinical Trial Billing and Contract
Negotiations, MOSES & SINGER LLP (May 2010), available at http://mosessinger.com/articles/
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The remaining alternative is to turn to the tort system. As set forth below, this is an
untenable solution.
B. THE TORT SYSTEM POSES SERIOUS CHALLENGES FOR ALL RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS
Because so few sponsors of research provide medical care or compensation for
research-related injuries, and because individual health insurance provides only
limited recourse, injured research participants often must turn to the tort system to
be made whole. The tort system, as mentioned above, is an unsatisfactory
compensation mechanism for almost all litigants—the tort system is time-
consuming, adversarial, expensive, and has a tendency to under-compensate most
injured participants while over-compensating a select few. ''*̂  The tort system is
uniquely difficult for injured research participants, even as compared with injured
medical patients, in ways that have not been fully appreciated.
Unlike medical malpractice, which has a robust body of case law, there are very
few reported cases dealing with research-related injury.'''^ A number of reasons have
been given for this lack of case-law, including effective implementation of the
informed consent process, the limited amount of damages potentially recoverable,
and the increasing conduct of clinical trials abroad where the likelihood of a case
going to trial may be lower than in the United States."*'* Another key factor is the
willingness of potential defendants to settle when presented with bad facts, a
sympathetic plaintiff, or the potential for bad precedent."*^ A key overlooked factor
is the extent to which tort law principles make recovery for research-related injuries
difficult.
Although some injured research plaintiffs have found legal success when armed
with facts suggesting that no informed consent had been given at all,''** as might be
files/HealthcareReformLawClinicalTrials.pdf Nevertheless, some currently uninsured individuals are
likely to become insured as a result of the new policy measures.
'""̂  See sources cited supra note 123.
See Roger L. Jansson, Research Liability for Negligence in Human Subfeet Researeh:
Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229, 230 (2003) ("[F]ew
cases have generated reported decisions; thus the case law interpreting tort liability of researchers is
scarce."); Michael Traynor, Clinical Trials: Emerging Products Liability And Insurance Issues, SB 16
ALI-ABA 179, 181 (1996) ("So far, there are very few reported cases involving liability for injury or
death in clinical trials.").
''"' See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 143.
'•" Estimates suggest that ninety percent of cases involving potential researeh liability are
dropped or settled, a figure comparable to the rate of medical malpractice suits that are dropped or
settled. E. Haavi Morreim, Clinical Trials Litigation: Practical Realities as Seen from the Trenches,
12 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 47, 52 (2005).
In cases for which no informed consent was obtained, individuals have successfully sued for
battery, an intentional tort that gives rise to punitive damages. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 17, at
478 (noting that battery "requires no expert testimony, no finding that the procedure was performed
negligently, and no causal connection between the battery and the injuries."). In some instances, the
failure to obtain informed consent was deemed sufficient to be considered a constitutional violation.
See Heinrieh v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 313-15 (D. Mass. 1999) ("Failure to provide adequate
disclosure of a potentially deadly medical experiment to subjects who were induced to participate on
the basis of fraud constitutes a procedural irregularity sufficient to trigger the protections of the Fifth
Amendment."); Stadt v. Univ. of Rochester, 921 F. Supp. 1023, 1027-28 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The
Constitution, and more specifically, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment clearly
established a right to be free from non-consensual, governmental experimentation on one's
body . . . . " ) ; In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (finding a
constitutional violation where plaintiffs were not informed that the radiation they were receiving was
part of a military experiment rather than treatment of their cancer); cf. Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Research
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expected, these cases are exceedingly rare. '''̂  Instead, most cases brought for
research-related injuries allege negligence.'''^
Injured research participants face several difficulties when seeking to recover
under a tort law negligence regime. The first difficulty that injured research
participants face is showing that researchers breached a duty owed to them. ''"
Unlike physicians who act primarily for the benefit of their patient, researchers are
primarily loyal to the research protocol and the generalizable knowledge that
beneflts future patients. "° While doctors may be liable if they deviate from the
generally accepted standard of care, research is an assessment of the effectiveness of
those deviations from the standard of care.'"
In recent years, both courts"^ and scholars"'' have seemingly settled on a duty
of care owed that is satisfied when researchers comply with federal regulations.
Found., Inc., 188 F.3d 1105, 1112 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that there was no constitutional
violation of the right to bodily integrity because the litigants knew they were serving as experimental
subjects rather than receiving treatment); Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F.
Supp. 2d 1286, 1295 (W.D. Wash. 2002) ("[I]n the absence of allegations that defendants hid the true
nature of the experiments and/or conducted them for non-therapeutic reasons, there is no
constitutional claim.").
''" See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 17, at 478.
'•" See, e.g.. THE LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at 39 ("Over time, negligence theory has replaced
common law battery as the basis for malpractice litigation except in those cases in which no consent at
all was obtained."). Injured research participants have brought suit alleging a wide variety of claims,
including negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, breach of confidentiality,
breach of contract, breach of privacy, product liability, and negligent conduct and monitoring of
research. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al.. The Rise o^Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40 (2003); THE LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at 40. Claims have expanded to
include alleged violations of rights based on the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the
U.S. Constitution, or the federal civil rights acts, though courts have generally been reluetant to
expand the rights in this way. See, e.g., Robertson ex rel. Robertson v. McGee, No. 01-CV-60-C, 2002
WL 535045 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2002); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.
Mass. 1999); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998). But see Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001) (suggesting that a duty of care might arise from
principles stated in the Nuremberg Code).
'""See, e.g., Childress, supra note 32, at 21 ("[MJalpractice suits depend on a standard duty of
'due care' which may be unclear in research settings."). One major research liability case. Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger, went so far as to suggest that the duty owed by researchers to research participants
should be determined on a case-by-base basis. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858. Grimes, however, has come
under considerable scrutiny and has faced significant criticism. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffman & Karen
H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for
Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 109 (2002). For an argument that the duties of
physician-researchers should not be different from the duties owed by physicians providing clinical
care, see Kathleen Cranley Glass & Duff Waring, The Physician/Investigator's Obligation to Patients
Participating in Research: The Case of Placebo Controlled Trials, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 575
(2005).
'™ Morreim, supra note 17, at 477 (noting that a researcher's "goal is not the betterment of any
particular participant").
' " See id. ("The standard of care for medical practice emphasizes conformity to customary and
prevailing practices . . . . In contrast, research cannot be judged by its conformity to customary
practice since it is, by definition, an express deviation from those routines, taken to gather
generalizable knowledge.") (internal citations omitted). While courts once held that a physician
experimented "at his peril" if his patients were harmed thereby, see PUB. HEALTH SERV., supra note
76, at 25; Morreim, supra note 17, at 476, courts have increasingly recognized that medical progress
requires experimentation, within permissible limits. See, e.g.. Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762, 765
(Mich. 1935).
"^ See, e.g., Daum v. SpineCare Med. Grp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the federal regulations designed to protect human research participants provided the
standard of care); Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that the
Common Rule established the standard of care for an informed consent claim against researchers).
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Thus, researchers who have obtained informed consent, obtained IRB approval prior
to beginning research, and satisfied a few additional legal requirements have
seemingly satisfied their duties to research participants. But if compliance with the
federal regulations satisfies the duty of care, only the very small class of participants
injured while participating in non-compliant research will ever be able to bring suit
successfully.'^''
Injured research participants also often have difficulty showing that the research
intervention caused their injury. Participants who have a condition that causes
symptoms similar to those resulting from the experimental treatment may have
difficulty showing that it was the treatment, rather than the underlying condition,
that caused injury.'" Participants may also have difficulty proving causation when
an intervention creates a statistically higher chance of contracting disease at a later
date. For example, tests of radiation exposure conducted by the U.S. government left
participants with an increased chance of developing cancer.'^* Exposed research
participants who later contracted cancer could have difficulty proving that their
particular cancer was more likely than not caused by the research intervention rather
than some other circumstance. ' " Injured research participants unable to prove
causation to the satisfaction of the infiexible "more likely than not" legal standard
will be denied recovery under the tort system.'^*
A third difficulty for injured research participants is the signed informed
consent document. Before enrolling in research, participants are required by law to
read and sign an informed consent document that lists all known risks of
participation.'^' The informed consent process is supposed to be thorough, with time
spent ensuring that research participants understand the risks that they accept by
participating in research.'*" Jurisdictions that limit or preclude recovery under the
assumption of risk doctrine would preclude research participants from recovering if
affd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987); Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1996) (adopting
the Common Rule as the standard of care for informed consent claims).
' "^ee . e.g., Roger L. Jansson, Research Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research:
Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229, 247 (2003) ("[T]here
appears to be an emerging trend among courts to use the federal regulations as the standard of care for
informed consent in human subject research."); Morreim, supra note 17, at 477.
See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 41, at 43 (noting that healthy British volunteers injured in
infamous trials of TGN1412 could have trouble succeeding in a negligence lawsuit if the sponsors
complied with research regulations).
' " See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 89, at 266 ("[I]t may be difficult to determine whether an injury
was caused by a research study, the subject's underlying illness, the subject's failure to follow
instructions, or some other cause.").
'*'' See, e.g., ADVISORY CoMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46, § III
ch. 17.
' " See, e.g., Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Causal Inference in Epidemiology:
Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 280-82 (1992) (noting that with
epidemiological calculations "population-based calculations should not be extrapolated directly to the
individual").
"* See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 96 ("This often complex and scientifically
demanding task typically must be performed to the satisfaction of a lay jury . . . ."). That is not to say
that injured research participants should be able to forego proving causation. In fact, the proposal set
forth in Part V.C requires that an injured research participant show, on balance of the probabilities,
that the research caused the participant's injury. One key difference is that under the proposal, the
causation element is evaluated by doctors and scientists most knowledgeable about the research
intervention and the underlying disease rather than judges or juries.
™ General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005).
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the researchers disclosed the potential injury in the informed consent document.'*'
Though intended to provide additional protection to research participants, a signed
informed consent document could nevertheless create a legal barrier to recovery.'*^
The final, and perhaps most significant, difficulty is the tort system's
requirement that the researcher be at fault. Routine researeh procedures—blood
draws, biopsies, radiologie seans, and lumbar punctures—all earry a degree of risk,
even when done properly. As noted by the Institute of Medicine, "[r]eseareh cannot
be entirely free of risk. Some researeh participants may ineur a research-related
injury even if the study is carried out without negligence and in full conformity with
the protoeol."'*'' In the FIAU researeh discussed in the Introduction, individuals died
as a result of their participation in research, yet an independent panel cleared the
researchers of any negligence or wrong-doing. In the absence of strict liability,
which has not been applied to biomedieal research,'*" injury without fault generally
eannot result in compensation under a standard tort regime.
Under the current negligence approach, only an extremely limited subset of
injured researeh participants can bring a successful tort lawsuit: those who were
injured in research that did not comply with federal regulations, when the injury
arose due to the researcher's fault, and in jurisdictions where researeh participants
are not precluded from recovering by a signed informed consent document.'*^ As
discussed in the next Part, this subset is limited even ñirther by laws that deny whole
classes of injured researeh participants access to the justice system.
C. SEVERAL CLASSES OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS ARE SYSTEMATICALLY
UNCOMPENSATED
In addition to the tort system posing challenges unique to all research
participants that make recovering for researeh-related injuries exceedingly difficult,
recent legal developments and a patchwork of legal doctrines prevent certain classes
""' See, e.g.. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Provided
the risks, including any loss of tort remedies, were adequately explained . . . [ , ] he cannot complain
that the risks materialized."); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 996 (2d Cir. 1987) (signing
an informed consent form for unorthodox cancer treatment created a jury question regarding
patient's assumption of risk); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 86 ("An injured subject may
also be required to overcome the claim that he or she assumed the risk of injury in agreeing to
participate in the research."); Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 387, 410-11 n.98 (2005) ("Arguably, if a subject's explicit agreement to accept the inherent risks
of research can be established, whether through the consent form or otherwise, the analytical
framework would shift from primary implied assumption of risk to express assumption of risk . . . .");
E. Haavi Morreim, Consumer-Defined Health Plans: Emerging Challenges from Tort and Contract,
39 J. HEALTH L. 307, 311 (2006) ("[l]nformed consent conversations will likely e v o l v e . . . .
[D]octrines like assumption of risk and contributory negligence/comparative fault can provide
considerable insulation from tort claims . . . ."). But see Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782
A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001) ("Researchers cannot ever be permitted to completely immunize themselves
by reliance on consents "); Childress, supra note 32, at 25 (noting that assumption of risk
requires that an individual know and understand the risk being incurred, an obligation arguably not
satisfied in some research).
"^ See sources cited supra note 161.
"•̂  INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 188.
"''' Strict liability for research-related injuries has been considered, but rejected. See, e.g..
SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at V-3 ("While the concept of strict liability has been
expanded in recent years, . . . [t]here is no indication that the courts are prepared to impose such strict
liability upon the research community."); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 94 ("[T]he
proposition that research with human subjects is an 'abnormally dangerous activity' subject to strict
liability standards finds no clear support in the empirical evidence or in legal precedent.").
' " PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 83-84.
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of research participants—participants in federally conducted research '̂ ^ and
international participants—from recovering through the tort system. This patchwork
of legal doctrines results in classes of injured research participants being denied
compensation in tort based on distinctions that are ethically irrelevant. U.S.
participants injured as a result of participating in privately conducted research have
difficulty recovering due to the principles set forth above but face no additional legal
obstacles and so are not discussed below.
1. U.S. Participants in Federally Conducted Research
Various legal doctrines—sovereign immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), and the discretionary fiinction exception—protect the government from
liability arising from most federally conducted research.'^'As applied, participants
injured as a result of participating in federally conducted research can only
successfully sue the federal government to the extent that their injuries arise from
actions that violate statutory and regulatory requirements. "'̂
The federal government is generally immune from suit under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.'*' Except in the limited circumstances in which the government
consents to be sued, individuals—including injured research participants—are
unable to bring suit against the federal government for injuries arising out of acts by
federal government employees.'™
One statute by which the government has consented to be sued is the FTCA, a
law that waives governmental immunity for injuries arising from torts committed by
government employees to the extent that private individuals would be liable for
similar injuries under state tort law.'" Under the FTCA, the federal government can
'"' This category is limited primarily to federally conducted research, and does not include all
federally funded research. See SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at V-1 (exploring
"[f]ederally conducted, supported (by grant or contract), and regulated research, particularly researeh
covered by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act"). Private entities receiving federal funds to
conduct research will be treated as non-federal entities, except to the extent they are so closely
supervised to be considered deputized federal agents. See. e.g., Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62
F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding that Associated Universities—a private corporation founded
by Harvard, Yale, and a number of other universities to operate research laboratories—could be
considered governmental for purposes of immunity due to the supervision and eontrol exercised by the
government).
'*'See, e.g., Andrew Hyer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act: A Proposal for a Workable Analysis, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1091, 1094-95 (2007) (discussing
governmental proteetion from liability under the discretionary function exception); Mark C. Niles,
"Nothing but Mischief": The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1279-80 (2002) (arguing that the FTCA, though meant to extend liability in
cases of federal employees and officers committing torts, has not been applied as such); infra note 169
and accompanying text.
See Niles, supra note 167, at 1292 (noting that courts hear cases in which the govemment has
violated a "regulation, statute, or Constitutional provision").
'"See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 417 (1996) ("The United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in
any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.") (internal citations omitted); FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 471 (1994) ("Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal
Government and its agencies from suit."); Federal Hous. Admin, v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940)
("[T]he United States cannot be sued without its eonsent.").
'™ See cases cited supra note 169.
' "See Liability of United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) (2010). An exception to Sovereign
Immunity that will not be discussed in detail in this Article is the Tucker Act, which waives
governmental immunity when the government enters into a eontract. See Claims against United States
generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2011). An injured research participant might pursue a claim under the
Tucker Act on the theory that the informed consent document creates a contract, the terms of which
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be liable for research-related injuries to the same extent private sponsors of researeh
would be liable.'^^
But the discretionary function exception to the FTCA renders the United States
immune from suit for discretionary acts even though a private individual could be
held liable."' The purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial seeond-guessing of
discretionary decisions that should rightfully be made by those hired to make
them.'^" The Supreme Court has interpreted the discretionary function exemption
broadly,'^^ rendering a wide variety of aets by the federal government immunized
under the diseretionary function exception,'^* including acts related to research."'
Courts have held the diseretionary function exception to immunize the federal
government from liability arising from the planning and execution of research. Two
eourts of appeals held that the diseretionary function exception applied to atomic
testing researeh eonducted by the federal government, during whieh civilians were
systematically exposed to atomic energy to measure its effects. Those injured
brought suit alleging that the government could have and should have done more to
protect the research participants.'™ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
noted that the research program "required difficult judgments balancing the
magnitude of the risk from radiation exposure . . . against the risks and burdens of a
bind the U.S. govemment. Though there is some support for the "informed consent as contract"
argument, see, e.g., Dahl v. Hem Pharm. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a consent
form in a research protocol formed a unilateral contract); Grimes v. Kennedy Kriger Inst., Inc., 782
A.2d 807, 843 (Md. 2001) (noting that an informed consent document can create a contract); Lori A.
Alvino, Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by
Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 919-20 (2003), the Tucker Act explicitly excludes
cases that sound in tort, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(l). Given that the underlying claim could sound in
tort, an action may be precluded by statutory language. To the extent the informed consent document
governs, any injury that is disclosed in the informed consent document could preclude recovery.
"^.See Niles, infra note 167, at 1279 ("The FTCA is a revolutionary statute which purports to
'waive' the sovereign immunity of the United States in cases arising out of torts committed by its
employees and officers.").
' " 5 e e Exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2010). Once governmental actions have been labeled
discretionary, it is immaterial whether or not actions are performed negligently. 14 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHTETAL. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3658.1 (3ded. Supp. 2011).
™ See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 (1988) (according this analysis "with
Congress's purpose in enacting the exception: to prevent 'judicial intervention in . . . the political,
social, and economic judgments' of governmental . . . agencies" (quoting United States v. Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984))).
"^ See, e.g., Hyer, supra note 167, at 1108 ("[M]any contend that the Supreme Court's current
approach unfairly leaves an injured party without a remedy simply because the injury was caused by a
government actor. . . ."); Niles, supra note 167, 1279 ("[The FTCA] had been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court to allow for a restriction on federal tort liability that is . . . essentially
identical to that applicable before the law was passed.").
' " See, e.g., Merando v. United States, 517 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the
discretionary-function exception applies to the National Forest Service's decision not to cut down
dead trees); Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the decision of the
National Park Service not to post warnings or close a trail was discretionary); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the government's decision to use Agent
Orange as a defoliant was discretionary); Ramirez v. U.S. Postal Serv., 893 F. Supp. 121 (D.P.R.
1995) (holding that implementation of security measures for a post office is discretionary).
'".See, e.g., Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Research Found., Inc., 339 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the United States's decision not to supervise government-funded research experiments testing the
effects of radiation on human testicular function was discretionary); Hagy v. United States, 976
F. Supp. 1373 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (holding that the government's decision to delegate safety and
warning responsibilities to independent medical researchers was discretionary).
™ E.g.. In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987); Allen v.
United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
'™ See cases cited supra note 177.
32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICfNE VOL. 38 NO. 1 2012
public program,"'^" and that "every aspect of a warning program is a matter that falls
within the discretionary function exception."'*' Faced with similar facts, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that "[pjlaintiffs' entire case rests on
the fact that the government could have made better plans. That is probably correct,
but is insufficient for FTCA liability."'*^
Injured research participants cannot bring suit for injuries arising from any part
of research that is discretionary—a term of art interpreted broadly.'^'' This leaves
open the possibility of recovery from the federal government only for injuries arising
from research acts that are not discretionary, i.e., violations of statutes, regulations,
or mandatory policies. '*'* Because research is highly regulated such that most
federally conducted research is compliant with the regulations, most aspects of
research giving rise to injury will be immunized by the discretionary function
exception.'*'Participants injured as a result of participating in federally conducted
research are not likely to be able to recover for their injuries through the tort system.
2. International Participants in Federally Conducted Research
Internadonal participants injured as a result of participating in federally
conducted research are entitled to even less protection. As discussed above, the U.S.
govemment is generally immune from suit under principles of sovereign immunity,
unless an exception applies. '*̂  The exception applicable to federally conducted
research—the FTCA—does not apply to acts that occur abroad.'*' Nor does the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a statute that grants jurisdiction to U.S. courts to hear
cases of torts committed abroad in violation of the law of nations, waive sovereign
immunity.'** Accordingly, international research participants who are injured as a
result of participating in federally conducted research are unable to access the U.S.
justice system.
The extent of governmental immunity from tort liability arising from federally
conducted research abroad is now being tested. In 2010, Professor Susan Reverby
uncovered evidence that between 1946 and 1948, U.S. researchers deliberately
infected prisoners and mental health patients in Guatemala with disease.'*'Upon
learning of the research, Guatemala expressed outrage that such research was
permitted and threatened to bring suit in U.S. courts."" Lawyers representing the
'*"/« re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 997.
" ' Id. at 998.
^^^ Allen, 816 F.2d at 1424.
'*' See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
'*" See, e.g., Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 323 (D. Mass. 1999)
(intemal citations omitted) ("An aet is not discretionary if a federal statute, regulation, or policy
mandates a course of action for an employee to follow . . . ."). Even negligently conducted research
may not give rise to liability if the original aet was discretionary because once governmental actions
have been labeled discretionary, it is immaterial whether those actions have been performed
negligently—the govemment is immune from suit. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 173, § 3658.1.
'^'See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., ̂ wpra note 173; sources cited ^upra note 175.
'^' See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
'*' See Exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2005). The foreign country exception was interpreted
broadly in the Supreme Court's recent decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
'**See, e.g.. Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 957 F.2d 886, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds the ATS claims against the United States); Goldstar
(Panama), S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 967-69 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Canadian Transp. Co.
V. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).
'*' Reverby, supra note 10.
"° See id. at 22 (noting the worldwide outrage sparked upon leaming ofthe Guatemala study).
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victims asked the United States to establish an out-of-court settlement procedure
similar to those established for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill or, alternatively, to waive
sovereign immunity.'" When these demands were not met, a class-action lawsuit
was filed,'^^ and the federal government responded with a motion to dismiss on
grounds of sovereign immunity."^ The families of the research participants may
soon learn precisely how limited the remedies are for injured international research
participants.
3. International Participants in Privately Conducted Research
The tort system prevents international research participants who are injured as a
result of participating in privately conducted research from recovering due to
entirely different substantive and procedural barriers."''As set forth below, recent
legal decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have foreclosed
recovery under the ATS, which is the primary way foreign individuals injured
abroad brought suit in the United States."^ International research participants also
are often blocked procedurally by forum non conveniens, a doctrine that permits
courts to dismiss cases to more suitable forums abroad."^ Together these operate to
deny injured international research participants access to the U.S. justice system in
the event of a research-related injury.
a. Substantive Barriers to Recovery: Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute
In 1996, Nigeria was suffering through an outbreak of bacterial meningitis.' ' At
the time ofthe outbreak, Pfizer was near FDA approval of its presumed wonder drug
Trovan, and having collected data on safety and efficacy in adults, decided to
conduct its remaining research in Nigeria. '̂ * Allegedly working in concert with
Nigerian doctors and Nigerian government officials, Pfizer recruited 200 sick
children who sought treatment at the local hospital.'^' Half of the children were
given Trovan, Pfizer's experimental drug, and the other half were given Ceftriaxone,
an FDA-approved drug, the safety and efficacy of which had already been
established.^""
Pfizer allegedly knew that Trovan had never previously been tested on children
in the form that was used, and that animal tests had shown life-threatening side
effects that included joint disease, abnormal cartilage growth, liver damage, and a
degenerative bone condition.^"' In conducting its research, Pfizer allegedly gave the
' " U.S. Sued Over Syphilis Tests in Guatemala, CBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2011, 1:22 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2011/03/14/syphilis-guatemala-obama-lawsuit.html.
"^ Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Garcia v. Sebelius, No. l:ll-cv-
00527-RBW (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2011).
' " E.g., Nedra Pickler, US Argues It Is Immune from STD Experiment Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 9, 2012, available at http://www.boston.com/yourtown/wellesley/articles/2012/01/
10/us argues it is immune from stdexperimentlawsuit/.
"'' See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
" ' For more information about the ATS, see infra Part III.C.3.a.
'"• For more information about forum non conveniens, see infra Part IlI.C.3.b.
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control group a deliberately low dose of the control drug Ceftriaxone to misrepresent
the effectiveness of Trovan. ̂ "̂  After two weeks of research, Pflzer allegedly left
without administering follow-up care.^°^ Of those who participated in the research,
eleven children died and many others were left blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain
damaged.^"'' It is difficult to determine with certainty the extent to which these
injuries were a result of exposure to the experimental drug or a consequence of
under-treating the bacterial meningitis.^*"
Following a Washington Post exposé that highlighted the nature of Pflzer's
research,^"* injured research participants brought suit alleging that Pflzer failed to
obtain any informed consent from research participants, failed to disclose or explain
the experimental nature of the study or the serious risks involved, failed to alert
children or their guardians of the side effects of Trovan, and failed to inform
participants that Doctors Without Borders was providing conventional, effective
treatment free of charge at the same site.^"'
The families sought compensation under the ATS, which gives district courts
original jurisdiction over any civil action brought "by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations."^"* Though enacted in 1789, the
Supreme Court did not address the scope of liability under the ATS until the 2004
decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,^"^ in which the Supreme Court held that only a
"narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of judicial remedy and at
the same time threatening serious consequences in international affairs," would be
actionable under the ATS.^'" The issue before the Second Circuit was whether non-
consensual medical research rose to the level of a violation of the law of nations.^"
Under Second Circuit precedent, only norms sufficiently universal, specific, and
mutual, i.e., norms with cross-border implications, were held to rise to the level of
the law of nations.^'^ The Abdullahi court concluded that the norm against non-
consensual medical experimentation was sufflciently universal,^'^ speciflc,^''' and
mutual" to rise to that level.^'* In what would come to serve as the high-water mark
'<>' I d
2 Id.
^°' Purportedly some of the subjects were deliberately given a reduced dose of Ceftriaxone, so
their deaths were likely a result of the underlying disease and could have been avoided with a proper
dose of the drug. See id
"̂̂  See Stephens, supra note 6, at AOl.
^°' Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 170.
™ See Alien's Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
"̂̂  Sosa V. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); .çee also Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 173
^'"Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
^" Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 172-74.
' " W . at 174.
^" Id. at 180-82 (finding sufficient universality because the principle had been embedded in U.S.
law by Congress, had been embedded in the laws of eighty-four other countries, and had been
articulated in a number of international treaties).
Id. at 184 (concluding that a "norm forbidding nonconsensual human medical experimentation
is every bit as concrete—indeed even more so—than the norm prohibiting piracy . . . or interference
with the right of safe conducts and the rights of ambassadors . . . ").
^" Id. at 186 (finding sufficient mutuality because the administration of unethical biomédical
research had potential for cross-border implications that threatened international peaee and security).
The Trovan trials apparently engendered distrust among the local population and contributed to an
eleven-month-long boycott of a polio vaccination campaign in 2004, which impeded international and
national efforts to vaccinate the population. As a result, between 2003 and 2006, a polio outbreak that
originated in Nigeria triggered a major international outbreak, causing polio to spread and to re-infect
twenty previously polio-free countries. Id. This possibility for global catastrophes, as well as the
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for injured international research participants, Pfizer ultimately settled its suit with
the Abdullahi plaintiffs for a reported seventy-five million dollars.^"
The glimmer of hope provided to injured international research participants by
the Abdullahi decision was short-lived. Little more than a year after the Second
Circuit decided Abdullahi, the court seemingly reversed course in addressing the
more general question of corporate liability under the ATS. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum^^^ the Second Circuit held that "insofar as plaintiffs bring claims under
the ATS against corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege violations of the law of nations,
and plaintiffs' claims fall outside the limited jurisdiction provided by the ATS."^'^
The court squared its decision with Abdullahi by saying that the Abdullahi court had
assumed, without deciding, that corporations could be held liable under the ATS.
The Second Circuit reached its conclusion that corporations could not be liable
under the ATS by looking to the treatment of corporations both historically and
under international law.^ '̂ The court found insufficient evidence that corporations
had been held liable historically or are held liable currently for violations of
international law. ^̂ ^ An impassioned dissent disagreed, pointing to early
interpretations of the ATS that suggested that corporations could be held liable^ '̂'
and noting that corporations in other countries are routinely held civilly liable for
violations of international law.'̂ '̂*
possibility of unethical research generating substantial anti-American animus and hostility, led the
court to the conclusion that the norm was sufficiently mutual. Id. at 187.
^" Although the holding in Abdullahi has been challenged as imprudently racing to declare a new
form of intemational law, the right to be free from non-consensual experimentation on one's body has
been recognized throughout U.S. history. See. e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)
(intemal citation omitted) (finding that "the protections of substantive due process have for the most
part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily
integrity"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) ("The integrity of an individual's
person is a cherished value of our society . . . ."); Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) (finding that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others . . . ").
^" See Joe Stephens, Pfiizer to Pay $75 Million to Settle Nigerian Trovan-Testing Suit, WASH.
POST, July 31, 2009, at A15.
^" Kiobel V. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
^" W. at 120. The court noted that suits "against the individual perpetrators of violations of
customary intemational law—including the employees, managers, officers, and directors of the
corporation" may still be brought under the ATS. Id. at 122.
"° See id. at 124 ("We have, in the past, decided ATS cases involving corporations without
addressing the issue of corporate liability.").
^" See id. at 125-27.
^^^ See id. at 145.
^ '̂ See id. at 162 (noting a 1907 U.S. Attomey General opinion that held that corporations could
be liable under the ATS).
^̂ '' See id. at 152 ("[T]he imposition of civil liability on corporations serves perfectly the
objective of civil liability to compensate victims for the wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced
everywhere in the world."); see also Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Alternative Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses, 26 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 43, 54-55 (2005) (noting that Canada, Australia, and England have held corporations
liable for human rights violations committed abroad); Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79,
97 (2011) (noting that laws imposing criminal liability on corporations for violations of international
law are widespread. Over half a dozen countries, including Australia, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, Norway, and the UK, impose criminal liability on corporations for violations of
international law.). The dissent pointed to policy reasons that would warrant holding corporations
liable under the ATS. The ATS is an important tool to ensure the protection of fundamental human
rights. Immunizing corporations from civil liability under the ATS could incentivize bad behavior. See
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149-50.
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Prior to Kiobel, courts that had considered the issue of corporate liability under
the ATS had overwhelmingly and explicitly concluded that corporations were
subject to suit in the United States under the ATS.^^' Only one case had ever been
outright dismissed under the theory that corporations are not liable under the ATS.̂ ^*
As a result of the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel, a number of cases brought
alleging corporate liability under the ATS have been summarily dismissed.^"
As expected,^^* the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Kiobel.^^^ The
Court will have to reconcile two competing lines of cases: the first granting
^" Cases permitting corporate liability under the ATS had been decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244, 261 n.l2 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We will also assume, without deciding, that corporations . . . may be
held liable for the violations of customary international law that plaintiffs allege."); Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) ("[Courts have]
repeatedly treated the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS] as
indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be."); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing the district court's dismissal of ATS complaint
against corporations on forum non conveniens grounds); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d
Cir. 1998) (vacating district court's dismissal of ATS case against corporation on forum non
conveniens grounds).
District courts within the Second Circuit had repeatedly held that corporations could be liable
under the ATS. See, e.g.. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("On at least nine separate occasions, the Second Circuit has addressed [ATS] cases against
corporations without ever hinting—much less holding—that such cases are barred."); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("A corporation is not immune
from civil legal action based on international law."); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Talisman's argument that corporate liability
under international law is not . . . sufficiently accepted in international law to support an ATS claim is
misguided.").
Cases in both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits concluded that corporations could be liable under
the ATS. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) ("In addition
to private individual liability, we have also recognized corporate defendants are subject to liability
under the ATS and may be liable for violations of the law of nations."); Romero v. Drummond Co.,
552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express
exception for corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from
complaints of torture against corporate defendants."); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th
Cir. 2007), vacated in part on other grounds, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane) (concluding that
claims against an international mining corporation were sufficient to warrant exercise of federal
jurisdiction under the ATS); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that a corporation may be subject to suit under the ATS for aiding and abetting violations of
customary international law), reh'g en bane granted, :}95 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 20021), appeal
dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
District courts in several other circuits have concluded similarly. See, e.g., Al-Quraishi v.
Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 755 (D. Md. 2010) ("[T]here is broad judicial agreement that the ATS
provides for corporate liability."); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 588 (E.D.
Va. 2009) ("Nothing in the ATS or Sosa may plausibly be read to distinguish between private
individuals and corporations; indeed. Sosa simply refers to both individuals and entities as 'private
actors.'").
^^'' See Abagninin v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2008).
^" See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(dismissing suit brought under the ATS stating that, under Kiobel, corporations cannot be liable under
the ATS); see also Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1116 (CD. Cal. 2010) (dismissing an ATS
action holding that customary international law does not apply to corporations).
The Supreme Court expressed interest in deciding the issue of eorporate liability under the
ATS once Abdullahi v. Pfizer was decided, and invited the solicitor general to file a brief expressing
the views of the United States. Pfizer v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 534 (2010) (mem.) (inviting the
solicitor general to file a brief expressing the views of the United States). The Supreme Court
ultimately denied certiorari at the behest of the solicitor general. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163
(2009), cert, denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1,
Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (No. 09-34). The Kiobel decision also creates a circuit split with regards to
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corporations the same rights and duties owed to individuals,^'" which suggests that
corporations will be liable under the ATS given that individual liability under the
ATS is well-established; and the second minimizing the extraterritorial application
of U.S. law,"' suggesting a more limited application of the ATS.̂ ^^ Unless or until
the Kiobel decision is overturned by the Supreme Court, it remains the law of the
Second Circuit—the circuit with the most established ATS jurisprudence^"—and
serves as an absolute barrier to recovery for international research participants
injured as a result of participating in privately conducted research.
b. Procedural Obstacle to Recovery: Forum Non Conveniens
Aside from the substantive legal barriers to recovery posed by the Kiobel
decision, injured international research participants face a procedural obstacle in the
form of forum non conveniens. Forum non conveniens is a discretionary doctrine
that permits a court to decline to hear a case on the basis that a more appropriate
alternative forum exists elsewhere.'̂ '''* Under the principle oí forum non conveniens,
courts may consider a variety of factors in determining whether another court is
better situated to hear a case, including the location of where the injury ^̂ ^
corporate liability under the ATS, with recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit holding that corporations can be liable under the ATS. See Doe
V. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[I]t would create a bizarre anomaly to
immunize corporations from liability for the conduct of their agents in lawsuits brought for
'shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of intemational law.'" (quoting
Zapata v. Quinn, 717 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983))); Flomo v. Firestone Nat'l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013,
1017 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that corporations can be liable under the ATS, and calling Kiobel an
"outlier"); Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1263 ("In addition to private individual liability, we have also
recognized corporate defendants are subject to liability under the ATS and may be liable for violations
of the law of nations."); Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 ("The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no
express exception for corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction
from complaints of torture against corporate defendants."); Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1193.
^'' Kiobel V. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, 2011 WL 4905479 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011).
™ See. e.g.. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that corporations are
entitled to First Amendment protection for political speech). But see FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct.
1177 (2011) (holding that corporations are not persons for purposes of the personal FOIA exemption).
" ' See. e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (limiting the
extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("[L]cgislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281,285 (1949))).
'̂̂  For a thoughtful and fulsome argument that corporations should be held liable under the ATS,
see, for example, Mamolea, supra note 224. For an argument to the contrary, see Julian Ku, The
Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial
Lawmaking, 52 VA. J. iNT'L L. 353 (2011).
^" Theresa (Maxi) Adamski, The Alien Tort Claims Act and Corporate Liability: A Threat to the
United States' International Relations, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1502, 1522 (2011) ("[T]he Second
Circuit . . . has heard a substantial number of ATCA cases and, consequently, handed down a series of
important decisions concerning corporate liability.").
^^* See, e.g., Jolyon Ford & George Tomossy, Clinical Trials in Developing Countries: The
Plaintiff's Challenge, L. SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. 1 (2004), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_l/ford/.
^" Among the factors a court may consider in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction on the
grounds oí forum non conveniens, some of which might argue in favor of a foreign forum, are: the
location of potential witnesses, the location of relevant evidence and records, possible undue hardship
for the defendant, availability of adequate ahemativc forums for the plaintiff, the expeditious use
of judicial resources, the choice of law applicable to the dispute, and the location where the cause of
action arose. See. e.g.. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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The Abdullahi plaintiffs provide a striking example of the way in which forum
non conveniens can serve to delay or potentially deny access to U.S. eourts.
Abdullahi involved a clinical trial condueted by Pfizer in Kano, Nigeria, that resulted
in the death of eleven children and serious injuries in scores of others. ̂ •'̂  The
Abdullahi plaintiffs first brought suit in the Southern District of New York, alleging
that Pfizer's experiment violated international law.^" The case was dismissed in
2002 on grounds oí forum non conveniens when the court found that Nigeria would
be an adequate alternative forum."*
The Abdullahi plaintiffs encountered several obstacles in Nigeria. The first
Nigerian judge was removed from the bench, a second judge declined to exercise
jurisdiction for personal reasons, and the suit was ultimately dismissed without
resolution. •̂ ^̂  In 2007, the Nigerian state of Kano brought independent criminal
charges and civil claims against Pfizer seeking over two billion dollars in damages
and restitution, and the federal government of Nigeria brought suit against Pfizer and
its employees seeking seven billion dollars in damages.^"" Only when faced with the
possibility of enormous civil and criminal liability in Nigeria did Pfizer agree to
litigate in the United States.^"'
As illustrated by Abdullahi, in the event of dismissal under forum non
conveniens, injured international research participants may be unable to obtain
adequate remedies abroad. Hosting research brings additional medical jobs and
healthcare to a community, and countries may worry that lawsuits against
researchers will discourage future research.^"^ Accordingly, impoverished countries
may actively discourage injured research participants from bringing lawsuits against
sponsors. "̂̂  Additionally, companies may be judgment-proof in foreign
jurisdictions, and countries may not have as established a civil tort law system as
does the United States. "̂̂  These barriers to recovery are sufficient to deny
international research participants injured as a result of participating in privately
conducted research meaningful access to compensation.^"*
Given this current legal landscape in which all injured researeh participants have
difficulty recovering under the tort system and several classes of research
participants are prevented from receiving compensation altogether, continued
reliance on the tort system is misguided at best and a dereliction of a moral
obligation at worst.
"' 'See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009), cert, denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541
(2010).
^"/rf. at 170.






Ford & Tomossy, supra note 234, § 3.3.
§
'"'' Given these circumstances, courts should take efforts to ensure that plaintiffs have a genuine
possibility of legal remedy in a foreign tribunal before dismissing cases on the ground of forum non
conveniens. Jolyon Ford and George Tomossy argue that "it is difficult to accuse injured subjects . . .
of inconvenient 'forum shopping' where they seek to sue a defendant research corporation in its home
jurisdiction, where that defendant might itself have been shopping around for a foreign trial site
holding the least likelihood of. . . legal accountability." Id. § 3.3.
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IV. NON-COMPENSATION IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO U.S. RESEARCH
In the past decade, the global research landscape has undergone a revolution.
Biomédical research has become an increasingly global enterprise.^'*' Multinational
trials are conducted in countries around the world, and are increasingly subject to
many national regulatory regimes.̂ '** In the past decade, nearly every country that
sponsors, hosts, or conducts substantial amounts of research has mandated
compensation for injured research participants. '̂*' By not requiring systematic
compensation, the United States has become a moral outlier and risks having
important biomédical advances delayed.
A. THE GLOBALIZATION OF BIOMÉDICAL RESEARCH
Over the past decade, the biomédical research enterprise has become
increasingly globalized, with research trials increasingly moving away from the
United States and Western Europe. ^̂ ° Countries outside the United States and
Europe were home to only 6.2 percent of trials in 1995, but were home to 20.9
percent in 2005.^^' The number of countries serving as trial sites outside the United
States more than doubled in the ten years between 1995 and 2005.^"
The number of FDA-regulated research investigators around the world has
undergone a similar shift away from the United States and Europe.'^" In the United
States, the number of FDA-regulated research investigators has dropped an average
of 5.5 percent annually since 2002, while the number of investigators outside the
United States has grown by 15 percent annually during the same period.^''*
Private industry trials have also undergone a migrafion. In 2004, Merck
conducted half of its clinical trials outside the United States.^" In 2006, Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals conducted 70 percent of its trials outside the United States and
Western Europe. ^̂ * In 2007, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
predicted that leading pharmaceudcal companies will conduct up to 65 percent of
their clinical trials abroad in the next few years.^" Given the increasing globalization
of research and the requirement that research conducted abroad comply with the
laws of the host country, U.S.-sponsored research must increasingly comply with
other countries' research regulations.
B. CONSENSUS TO COMPENSATE AMONG COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN RESEARCH
In the past ten years, many of the countries that sponsor, host, or conduct
substantial amounts of research have implemented policies to ensure that research
participants are systematically compensated in the event of research-related
"̂̂  See Glickman et al., supra note 13, at 816-17.
^""Id. at 817-18.
™ PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at app. IV.
™ Glickman et al., supra note 13, at 816.
^" Id. at 818. Western Europe was home to forty percent of trials in 1995, and thirty-six and a
half percent of trials in 2005. Id.
^" Id. at 816.
''' Id.
' ' ' ' See Carolyne R. Hathaway et al.. Looking Abroad: Clinical Drug Trials, 63 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 673 (2008).
" ' ADRIANA PETRYNA, WHEN EXPERIMENTS TRAVEL: CLINICAL TRIALS AND THE GLOBAL
SEARCH FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS 13 (2009).
^" Hathaway et al., supra note 254, at 674.
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injuries. In the past decade, thirty-one European countries have mandated
compensation for research-related injuries.^^' These European countries join several
research-intensive countries outside of Europe—including Australia, Brazil, China,
India, Israel, Japan, South Africa, and Uganda—that have all mandated
compensation for research-related injuries.^^" While some have merely required that
free medical care and financial compensation be provided as needed, other policies
are more elaborate.
In 2001, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
issued a directive mandating that E.U. member states implement systematic
compensation for research-related injuries by 2004.^^' Under the directive, a clinical
trial may be conducted only if "provision has been made for insurance or indemnity
to cover the liability of the investigator and sponsor" as evaluated and verified by a
research ethics committee. ̂ ^̂  Because the E.U. directive does not set forth the
specific contours of the requirement, E.U. member states have interpreted the
requirement in a variety of ways.̂ ^^
Germany had long required research sponsors to purchase insurance to cover
injuries to research participants. ^^ Under German law, insurance must cover
^"' For a general discussion ofthe limited rights provided to research participants in the United
States contrasted with rights provided in European clinical trials, see Robert Steinbrook,
Compensation for Injured Research Subjects, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1871 (2006) (noting that
"despite decades of discussion and recommendations by national commissions, sponsors and
institutions are not required to provide either free medical care or compensation . . . . In contrast,
many European countries mandate the provision of clinical-trials insurance, through which subjects
are often covered regardless of fault.").
™ See EUROPEAN FORUM FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE, THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ETHICAL
REVIEW OF PROTOCOLS FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH PROJECTS IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: OUESTION 31
(2010) [hereinafter EUROPEAN FORUM].
™̂ See INDIAN COUNCIL OF MED. RESEARCH, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMÉDICAL RESEARCH
ON HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 29 (2006) (India); MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL OF S. AFR., GUIDELINES ON
ETHICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH: GENERAL PRINCIPLES app. IV, § 1.1 (2002) (South Africa); N A T ' L
HEALTH & M E D . RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL STATEMENT ON ETHICAL CONDUCT IN HUMAN
RESEARCH 38 (2007) (Australia); NAT'L HEALTH COUNCIL, RESOLUTION NO. 196/96 ON RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1987) [hereinafter BRAZIL COMPENSATION] (Brazil); UGANDA NAT'L
COUNCIL FOR SCI. & TECH., NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS AS
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 28 (2007) (Uganda); GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE (BOARD ORDER NO. 3),
Art. 43 (2003) (China) (cited in PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at app. IV).
' " See Council Directive 2001/20, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34 (EC).
'^''^ Id. at arts. 3.2(f), 6.3(h). E.U. member states were required to transpose the directive into
national laws, regulations, and procedures by May 2003 and to implement them by May 2004 Id at
art. 22(1).
For example, countries have established various insurance minimum thresholds. Poland has
adopted a graduated approach to insurance requirements. For research trials with fewer than ten
participants, insurance coverage must total at least €500,000. For trials with more than 100
participants, insurance must cover at least €5 million. EUROPEAN FORUM, supra note 259, at 31-35.
Spain requires insurance coverage of at least €250,000 per subject. Id. at 31-36.
The European Union is currently revisiting its approach. Because the directive granted member
states flexibility in implementing requirements, it has "led to a situation where Member States have
slightly divergent national provisions based on identical concepts" in ways that "make multinational
clinical trials more burdensome and expensive." EUROPEAN COMM'N OF HEALTH & CONSUMERS
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, REVISION OF THE 'CLINICAL TRIALS DIRECTIVE' 2 0 0 1 / 2 0 / E C : CONCEPT
PAPER SUBMITTED FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION 8 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
health/files/clinicaltrials/concept_paper_02-2011.pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMM'N]. Under
proposed revisions, sponsors of research that poses only minimal risk of harm to participants may not
be obligated to provide insurance or indemnification. The revision could also result in member states
indemnifying directly any damages resulting from clinical trials within their borders. Id. at 12.
^" INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 189.
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economic loss, but not pain and suffering.^*' Injured research participants must show
that the research intervention caused the participant's injury, and injuries must occur
within three years of the conclusion of research, to be compensable.^** The amount
of any insurance payment is capped at €600,000 per injured participant, and up to
€120 million per trial.^*'
Under Spanish law, participants injured as a result of participating in research
are entitled to no-fault compensation that covers both the physical and economic
consequences of those injuries.^** The law also establishes a presumption that
injuries suffered within a year of the trial were caused by the trial.^*' To the extent
that injuries are not otherwise covered by insurance during a clinical trial,
Spanish law makes the sponsor of a trial, the principal researchers, and the medical
director of the hospital in which research is carried out jointly liable.^'" The sponsor
must have insurance coverage of at least €250,000 per research participant."'
In the Netherlands, a sponsor may be discharged of the obligation to purchase
insurance if a research ethics committee determines that participation carries no
inherent risk.'̂ '̂  If the obligation is not waived, insurance must cover death and
injury to the subject occurring during, or in the five-year period immediately
following, the trial.^''' Insurance need not cover injury that would have occurred had
the individual not participated in research. ^''' Insurance must cover at least
NLGl,000,000 (approximately $640,000) per subject, NLG15,000,000 (less than
$10 million) per research project, and NLG20,000,000 (less than $13 million) per
insurance year for all research conducted by an institution."' The informed consent
form must disclose the extent of insurance, if any, for each research protocol."*
Outside of Europe, the countries most involved in the research enterprise have
implemented their own policies to ensure that research participants receive
compensation in the event of injury. " ' Some countries have relatively
straightforward policies, requiring simply that research ethics committees ensure that
adequate arrangements to compensate injured research participants are in place
before allowing research to proceed. Other countries have more elaborate policies
and justifications for these policies.
Under Ugandan law, once injury occurs, an evaluation is made regarding the
extent to which the injury resulted from research.^'* If injuries are classified as
"probably" or "definitely" related to participation in research, participants are
entitled to free medical treatment for their injuries and to flnancial or other
«̂ Id
^""Id
^" See, e.g., Arzneimittelgesetz [AMG] [Medicinal Products Act], Dec. 12, 2005,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 3394, § 88, last amended by Gesetz [G], May 25, 2011,
B G B L 1 at 946, art. 1 (Ger.).
^̂ ^ Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 5.
^" See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 189.
" ' Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 6.
™ MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WELFARE & SPORT, INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION SERIES HEALTH,






" ' See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
" ' UGANDA NAT'L COUNCIL FOR SCI. & TECH., supra note 260.
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assistance as would compensate them "for any resultant impairment, disability or
handicap.""^
Brazil has the most expansive system in place to compensate those who are
injured as a result of participating in research.^*" Under the Brazilian system,
compensable injuries include the "possibility of injury to the physical, psychic,
moral, intellectual, social, cultural, or spiritual dimensions of the human subject."^^'
Under Brazilian law, the "researcher, the sponsor and the institution must assume
full responsibility for providing comprehensive care to the research subjects."^^^
Research participants who suffer any type of injury resulting from participation in
research, regardless of whether or not it was listed in the consent document, have the
right to receive comprehensive medical care, as well as compensation.^^'
Several countries, including the United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia, New
Zealand, and—de facto—Singapore, ^̂ ^ have adopted compensation systems
modeled on the Guidelines on Compensation for Trial Related Injuries promulgated
by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry. ^̂ * Discussed in more
detail in Part V.C, these guidelines set forth parameters for compensating injured
research participants that have been applied in countries around the world.
As set forth above, nearly every country that is substantially involved in the
research enterprise has implemented systematic compensation for research-related
injuries; every country, that is, except for the United States, the world's leading
sponsor r '" ' ^^'^
C. LACK OF SYSTEMATIC COMPENSATION DELAYS IMPORTANT U.S.-SPONSORED
BIOMÉDICAL RESEARCH
Given the emerging consensus among many of the countries substantially
involved in the research enterprise that injured research participants are entitled to
free medical care and necessary financial compensation, sponsors of research that
are unwilling to compensate injured research participants are at risk of having their
research blocked by foreign research ethics committees. This concern is not merely
hypothetical. In 2008, a major trial funded primarily by the NIH was to be rolled out
at 200 international sites, 100 of which were in Europe. ^̂ ^ Late in the planning
^""See BRAZIL COMPENSATION, supra note 260. Brazil has implemented a more comprehensive
view of the right to health. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 granted the right to health to all
citizens, and mandated the creation of a national healthcare system. Joao Biehl et al., Judicialisation
of the Right to Health in Brazil, 373 LANCET 2182, 2183 (2009) ("The Brazilian Constitution of 1988
granted the right to health to all citizens and mandated the creation of a national health-care system.").
^*' BRAZIL COMPENSATION, supra note 260, § II.8.
^^^ Id. § V.5.
"̂̂  Id. § V.6.
^'"•U.M. Thatte et al.. Review of Policies for Infuries to Research Participants in India 35 J
MED. ETHICS 133,138 (2009).
^*' SING. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NATIONAL MEDICAL ETHICS COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS




^*' Id.; Thatte et al., supra note 284, at 138.
See Glickman et al., supra note 13, at 817-18 (showing numbers of clinical trial locations by
country); supra Part III.B.
*̂* James D. Neaton et al.. Regulatory Impediments Jeopardizing the Conduct of Clinical Trials
in Europe Funded by the National Institutes of Health, 1 CLINICAL TRIALS 705, 707-08 (2010).
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stages, NIH notifled those involved that it would not serve as sponsor if required to
compensate injured research participants.^*' As a workaround, the NIH asked a grant
recipient, the University of Minnesota, to assume sponsorship of the trial in what
became one of the flrst instances of a U.S. university sponsoring an NIH-funded,
multi-center, multi-national trial. ̂ '̂  This workaround required several months of
intense, time-consuming negotiations, resulted in substantial increases in trial costs
for both the NIH and the University of Minnesota, and caused disruption at the
clinical sites, many of which had already selected participants who became ineligible
due to the delay.^"
On another occasion, a U.S. sponsor of research conducted in Mali was ordered
by a monitor from the WHO to purchase clinical trial insurance, after the trial had
begun, to comply with Malian law.^'^ In response, the sponsors contacted clinical
insurance companies about providing insurance; all were reluctant to insure a trial
that had already begun. It took several months to straighten out the insurance
requirement, delaying valuable research.^''
More recently, in the spring of 2011, the Indian government noticed that several
leading pharmaceutical companies—Wyeth, Quintiles, Lilly, Amgen, Bayer, Bristol
Mayer, Sanofl, PPD, and Pflzer—had not paid the compensation required under
Indian law to research participants who died while participating in research.^''' The
Drug Controller General of India made clear that if the pharmaceutical companies
did not pay the mandated compensation, they would not be allowed to conduct trials
in India.^" This situation is currently unresolved.
By not mandating compensation, the United States has become a moral outlier
in terms of protecting research participants, and U.S. sponsors of research risk
having their research delayed or halted when conducted abroad. As discussed in
Part V, the cost of mandating compensation for research-related injuries is minimal.
The cost to the U.S. biomédical industry of not compensating injured research
participants—and the potential delay of biomédical advances—threatens to be
considerably greater.
V. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT NO-FAULT
COMPENSATION
The United States's continued reliance on the tort system to compensate injured
research participants—despite a changed legal landscape and a changed global
research landscape—is misguided at best, and a dereliction of a moral obligation at
worst. The tort system is a particularly problematic way of ensuring that injured




'"" Malaria Vaccine Dev. Branch Div. of Intramural Research, Clinical Trial Insurance for Phase
1 and 2 Vaccine Trials (Mar. 22, 2006) (presentation on file with the author). In May 2004, a
collaborative research enterprise between the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, an
institute within the NIH, and a university in Mali was set to begin trials of a potential malaria vaccine.
Because insurance/self-insurance was required under the law of Mali, conducting research without an
insurance/self-insurance system in place rendered the research noncompliant. Id.
™ Id.
'̂"' Kounteya Sinha, Clinical Trials Claimed 25 Lives in 2010, Only 5 Paid Compensation, TIMES
OF INDIA (June 6, 2011, 1:40 AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-06-06/india/
29624892_1 clinical-trials-drug-controller-general-dcgi.
"" Id
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unable to show that a duty has been breached, many will have difficulty proving
causation, all participants have a signed informed consent document that can limit or
preclude recovery in assumption-of-risk jurisdictions, and many will be unable to
show that their injury was the researcher's fault. Moreover, a complex and evolving
patchwork of statutes and case-law leaves several classes of research participants—
participants in federal research and intemational participants—unable to access the
U.S. legal system.
This Part examines two proposed solutions to the inadequacies of the tort
system, including modifying the language in informed consent documents and
implementing a no-fault compensation system. The Part concludes that only a no-
fault compensation system ensures that injured research participants have adequate
access to compensation. After analyzing several proposed no-fault compensation
systems, this Part concludes that an insurance/self-insurance requirement similar to
that implemented in countries around the world would most effectively and
efficiently compensate injured research participants. This Part details parameters for
implementing a no-fault compensation system, both in the United States and in
countries around the world, that has potential to harmonize varying national
compensation requirements and thereafter examines and addresses potential critiques
of such a proposal.
A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As described above, injured research participants face serious challenges to
obtaining compensation through the tort system. This Part poses two possible
solutions to this problem ranging from: (1) the very modest: merely modifying the
informed consent language to make clear to participants that they retain very limited
legal remedy in the event of research-related injuries; to (2) an overhaul:
implementing a no-fault compensation system. ^̂ * Implementing no-fault
compensation best ensures that injured research participants receive compensation
for their injuries. It also requires the most political will to implement. Should that
political will fail to materialize, the language in informed consent documents should
be modified to reflect accurately the legal landscape for injured research
participants.
1. Modified Disclosure
The language in informed consent documents must be modified to more
accurately reflect the legal remedies available to injured research participants.
Research participants who enroll in research are not aware of the extent to which
they are legally unprotected in the event of a research-related injury. In fact, the
language of informed consent documents mandated by federal regulation—stating
that participation in research does not mean surrendering legal rights '̂̂  —
misleadingly suggests that injured research participants have legal rights that they
This Article does not seriously consider modifying the tort system. Modifications to the tort
system would likely be unduly burdensome to implement and would be insufficient to protect injured
research participants. Modifications to the tort system would not be able to overcome the barriers
posed by the requirement of fault, assumption of risk, sovereign immunity,/oraw non conveniens, and
Kiobel V. Royal Dutch Petroleum, discussed in more detail in Part III.
The language generally used is: "You will not be giving up any of your legal rights by signing
this consent form" or "you have the right to pursue legal remedy if you believe that your injury
justifies such action."
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retain. Given how few injured research participants have any chance of recovering
under the tort system, the language in the informed consent document is misleading
at best.
A minor revision of the language in informed consent documents could alert
research participants to the fact that they retain very limited legal rights in the event
of a research-related injury. Federal regulations could require, or research
institutions could voluntarily include, the following language in informed consent
documents:
While you are permitted to bring suit in the event of injury, existing
law and policy make it hard for you to obtain money damages if you
are injured (or almost impossible if you are an international participant
or a participant in federal research). The cost of any injury will likely
be borne by you, or by any private insurance that you have.
This proposed modification confers two main advantages. First, such disclosure
permits research participants to make a truly informed decision about participating
in research. For those who argue that informed consent implies an acceptance of
risks associated with research that relinquishes an institution from obligations to
compensate injured research participants—an argument that, as discussed above in
Part III.C, is overly legalistic and insufficiently protective of research participants—
informed consent must be truly informed. Research participants are likely to believe
that the tort system in the United States protects them in the event of injury. As
presented in this Article, the tort system provides very limited protection. Modifying
the informed consent language permits research participants to make a truly
informed decision to participate in research.
Second, this language makes clear the potential consequences of research
injuries to sponsors of research. Given that the extent to which injured research
participants are legally unprotected has not been clear, research sponsors may be
unaware that injured research participants have such limited legal remedy. Requiring
research institutions to acknowledge the reality faced by injured research
participants could prompt some institutions to modify their policies and offer
compensation and care to injured research participants.
This proposal has potential negative consequences. Research participants who
consider participating in research might reconsider upon learning the extent to which
they are unprotected in the event of a research-related injury. If fewer people choose
to participate in research, researchers may have increased difficulty recruiting
research participants, which may slow the development of important medical
advances. But the risk of losing potential research participants as they learn the truth
is inherent in the disclosure of any risks during the informed consent process, and
this has never justified withholding important information.
2. Mandated No-Fault Compensation System
A more comprehensive proposal to address the inadequacies of the tort system is
to implement no-fault compensation. No-fault compensation has certain advantages
over the tort system. The tort system is a time-consuming process, and its adversarial
nature can discourage viable and important claims.^'* The tort system is also
expensive, with high transactions costs.^'' Participants injured for reasons other than
See, e.g., Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 2.
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fault fall outside the tort system entirely.̂ *"* Even among those participants whose
injury is fault-based, the tort system can be unpredictable; the tort system has a
tendency to under-compensate or fail to compensate most injured participants, while
over-compensating others.^"'
No-fault compensation systems, by contrast, generally allow for speedier
resolution of claims, are generally less costly to administer, and permit a larger
percentage of payment to go to the injured party.^"^ Because the determination of
fault becomes irrelevant, no-fault compensation systems tend to encourage open
communication among the parties, which allows sponsors and researchers to assess
the circumstances that gave rise to injury and provide feedback to make future
research safer.'"''' Although limited empirical data exist about no-fault compensation
systems for research-related injuries, what data there are suggest that no-fault
systems in this area are cost-effective.^"'*
No-fault compensation systems for research-related injuries are demonstrably
feasible, as nearly every country that sponsors, hosts, or conducts substantial
amounts of research has implemented them.̂ "^ No-fault compensation can take a
variety of forms, and the umbrella term "no-fault compensation" is broad enough to
encompass systems as diverse as workers' compensation, personal auto insurance,
and the vaccine court established to compensate those injured by vaccination, as
discussed in more detail below.
No-fault compensation systems do have detractors, however, and no-fault
compensation has been criticized for lacking tort law's deterrent effect,̂ "^ for its
^''' and for its potential to short-change victims.^"* But properly implemented.
°̂° See Scott, supra note 137, at 423; Resnik, supra note 89, at 283-85.
•"" See McEwin, supra note 123, at 737; O'Connell, supra note 123, at 63 ("The aftempt to
achieve a fair and rational method for the compensation of vietims has been displaced by a form of
litigation lottery.").
^"^See, e.g., INST. OE MED., supra note 72, at 190-91; Mark M. Hager, No-Fault Drives Again: A
Contemporary Primer, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793, 807 (1998) (noting that no-fault pays a higher
proportion of premium income to claimants than does the tort system, reduees over- and under-
compensation, and delivers compensation more quickly than does the tort system); Mariner, supra
note 95, at 121; McEwin, supra note 123, at 739 ("Many studies have demonstrated that the tort
system is not only slower to provide compensation than no-fault but also tends to overcompensate
small losses and undercompensate large losses.").
'"^ See. e.g., Resnik, supra note 89, at 283.
"̂̂  See infra Part V.D for more information on the cost-effectiveness of no-fault compensation
systems for research-related injuries.
^"^ See supra Part IV.B.
^ 'See, e.g.. Hager, supra note 302, at 794-95 ("No-fault's disadvantages are chiefly two-fold:
(1) loss of tort law's purported role in deterring unsafe driving; and (2) loss of tort law's purported
corrective justice function in securing recompense for injury victims from culprits who inflict
injury."); Henry Huang & Farzad Soleimani, What Happened to No-Fault? The Role of Error
Reporting in Healthcare Reform, 10 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 7-8 (2009) ("Critics also argue
that no-fault systems produce the wrong incentives for doctors and victims. Simply put, without fault
in the compensation process, there is no (or at least less) stigma associated with fault, and therefore
less ineentive to prevent mistakes.").
'̂" See. e.g.. Hager, supra note 302, at 808 ("Existing no-fault has not brought reduced
premiums, despite claims by advocates that it should."); Huang & Soleimani, supra note 306, at 7
("Despite these harsh criticisms of tort, the no-fault altemative has ample detractors. One of its
biggest sticking points is cost.").
™' See. e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and
Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 651 (2000) ("[N]o-fault's denial of pain and
suffering compensation to the victims of negligent driving is a denial that raises a fairness problem
with no-fault."); Lindsay J. Stamm, The Current Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Need for Reform to
Ensure a Tomorrow for Oregon's Obstetricians, 84 OR. L. REV. 283, 306 (2005) ("Critics of no-fault.
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i.e., with insurance premiums determined by a research institution's safety record,
no-fault compensation can retain some level of deterrence while remaining cost-
effective. And the criticism that some would receive more under the tort system is
counterbalanced by the ability of no-fault compensation to make more equitable and
rational payments.^"^
Ultimately, a no-fault compensation system goes furthest in ensuring that
research participants—those who accept additional risk to help generate important
benefits for society—are compensated in the event of injury. Only no-fault
compensation systems are broad enough to ensure coverage for the participants
killed or seriously injured in the FIAU research discussed in the Introduction:
research that had serious consequences but for which researchers were cleared of
negligence or carelessness.
B. NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
Although perhaps requiring significant political will to put into practice,
implementing a no-fault compensation system is also the most effective way to
ensure that injured research participants receive compensation for their injuries.'""
This Part examines the various no-fault compensation systems that have been
proposed—a no-fault insurance/self-insurance requirement, a specialty court like the
vaccine court, a pooled or funded compensation system, and mandating personal
coverage—and evaluates their merits.
A number of criteria have been set forth for evaluating a no-fault compensation
system. Though not putting forth concrete proposals, the 1982 President's
Commission set forth the following characteristics of an ideal compensation system:
treat like cases alike, make fair payment for the harm sought to be remedied, and
disburse payments with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative cost.^"
An ideal system should also incentivize research sponsors to manage and mitigate
risks to participants and should require minimal new bureaucracy. Moreover, any
U.S. no-fault compensation system must comply with current legal limitations in the
spending of federal ftinds. Both the Anti-Deficiency Act^'^ and the Adequacy of
Appropriations Act^'^ prevent agencies that receive federal ftinds from incurring
ftiture financial obligations that have not already been fully funded by a
notably plaintiffs attorneys, argue it would shortchange victims who could fare better under the
existing tort system.").
"" See, e.g.. Hager, supra note 302, at 806 (noting that studies have "found existing no-
fault schemes superior to tort for rational and efficient delivery of compensation").
'"' For this reason, a number of scholars have advocated no-fault compensation in the area of
research-related injuries. See. e.g., Michael Traynor & Erin Wallace, Clinical Trials: Emerging Issues
Regarding Globalization of Pharmaceutical Research, Insurance, Informed Consent, Securities
Litigation, and Public Policy, Presentation at CLE Seminar on Emerging Issues in Biotechnology Law
(Sept. 6-7, 2007), available at http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_s5SiteRepository/FileUpload21/1348/
Article%20-%20Sep%2007%20-%20Traynor%20-%20Clinical%20Trials.pdf ("[University of
Washington's no-fault compensation system] bears serious consideration in the U.S. as evolving
ethical standards here as well as legal requirements in foreign countries call for it to be implemented.
Although the empirical data is lacking, this approach might hold the promise of reducing the incidence
of substantial tort liability claims and attendant increased liability insurance costs.").
•"' See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 127.
^'^See Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l)(A) (2010)
(forbidding the obligation of funds not already appropriated).
' "See No contracts or purchases unless authorized or under adequate appropriation, 41 U.S.C.
§ 1 l(a) (2010) (forbidding the government to obligate itself by contract "unless the same is authorized
Ijy law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment").
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congressional appropriation."'* These laws have formed the basis of the current NIH
policy of not compensating injured research participants.'" Finally, an ideal no-fault
compensation system would take steps towards harmonizing the various national
compensation policies.
As set forth above, nearly every country that sponsors, hosts, or conducts
substantial amounts of research has mandated a no-fault insurance/self-insurance
requirement. This Part concludes that an insurance/self-insurance requirement best
satisfies the goals of compensating all injured research participants fairly, quickly,
with the least administrative burden, and in accordance with federal regulations. It
also has the advantage of potentially satisfying legal requirements worldwide.
1. Insurance/Self-Insurance Requirement
The first proposed no-fault compensation system, an insurance/self-insurance
requirement, is the most common system of compensating injured research
participants around the world,"* These compensation systems operate much like
workers' compensation systems.'" Under an insurance/self-insurance requirement,
research sponsors are required to buy insurance, or must agree to compensate injured
research participants directly, before research is allowed to proceed. "*
Compensation generally covers the medical and flnancial costs of injury; recovering
for unlimited pain and suffering, punitive damages, and negligence are generally not
permitted.'" Compensation is generally received in exchange for an agreement not
to sue.'^"
A no-fault insurance/self-insurance requirement for research injuries satisfies
many of the criteria set forth above: like injured research participants are treated
alike, injured research participants receive fair payment for their harm, and
payments can be made with maximum efficiency and minimum administrative
burden.'^' The requirement that sponsors purchase insurance or agree to compensate
injured research participants directly incentivizes sponsors of research to reduce risk,
the cost of insurance may be tied to the institution's safety record and to the
thoroughness and safety of the research protocol, and the more careftil and thorough
the researchers are, the cheaper the insurance should be. '" Self-insurance places the
' '"See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l)(A); 41 U.S.C. § ll(a).
' "See, e.g., Charles Marwick, Compensation for Injured Research Subjects, 297 JAMA 1854,
1854 (1998) (justifying the NIH's policy of non-compensation because it is unable "to provide
funding for health care costs that go beyond the contract period"); What Else Should I Know About
Clinical Research?, NAT'L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEV. (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/clinicalresearch/aboutclinicalresearch.cfm (citing the Anti-
Deficiency Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations Act research as the reason why "participants in a
federally funded study can not [sic] sue the federal government for a claim of injury, loss, or
damage").
' " See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at app. IV.
^" Though subject to the criticism discussed below, workers' compensation systems have also
been heralded as an "enormous boon to efficiency" that addresses the goals of efficiency, deterrence,
corrective justice, and distributive justice, and "coincided with an enormous reduction in industrial
accident rates." Jeffrey O'Connell & John Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A Workable
Compromise Between First and Third-Party Insurance, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 133-34 (2005).
"*See, e.g.. Council Directive 2001/20, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34 (EC), art. 3.2(f).
' " THE LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at 19.
"° Cf. id. ("In exchange for the certainty of reasonably speedy compensation on a no-fault basis,
injured employees are required to give up their rights to sue their employers.").
'^' See, e.g., O'Connell & Linehan, supra note 317, at 133-34.
™ Cf. id. at 134 (noting that under workers' compensation, "producers retain an incentive to
provide a safe workplace environment" as "refiected in the employer's experience-rated premiums").
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ftiU costs of any injury squarely on the institution, incentivizing the institution to
manage and mitigate risk. And depending on how it is implemented, an
insurance/self-insurance requirement may require only minimal new bureaucracy.
Workers' compensation systems have been criticized for inadequately
compensating those injured in ways that might apply to systems for compensating
injured research participants. These criticisms must be acknowledged and dealt with
in any proposed system for compensating those injured by research. In delineating
what constitutes a compensable event, architects of any compensation system must
be mindful of the shortfalls in workers' compensation systems. And while workers'
compensation systems generally provide no recourse to the tort system, no-fault
compensation systems for research injuries could provide limited recourse to the tort
system, permitting injured research participants to choose between payments that are
quick and certain but more limited, and payments that are larger but less certain and
more time-consuming to obtain.̂ ^^
Depending on how it is structured, an insurance/self-insurance requirement
could comply with the statutory mandates of the Anti-Deficiency Act or the
Adequacy of Appropriations Act.̂ '̂* An insurance policy involves a fixed payment at
the outset of research and shifts any unfunded liability to the insurer rather than the
research sponsor. Private sponsors of research and entities receiving federal funds
can purchase insurance out of their research budget without bumping into the
limitations of the Anti-Deficiency Act or the Adequacy of Appropriations Act. The
same may not be true for federal agencies which, under regulatory policy, are not
generally able to purchase private insurance without a statutory grant of authority.''^^
Most importantly, an insurance/self-insurance requirement complies with
international compensation systems, as this is precisely the system adopted by many
other countries.^^*
2. Specialty Court
A second no-fault compensation system that scholars and commissions have
suggested is a no-fault specialty court modeled on the vaccine court.''̂ ^ The vaccine
court is often hailed as a model system for compensating injured research
participants because it is a health-related court that has successfully implemented
no-fault compensation.^^^ The mission of the vaccine court is to provide a "swift,
flexible, and less adversarial alternative to the often costly and lengthy civil arena of
traditional tort litigation."^^'
^" Id. (noting that those injured exchange "the guarantee of prompt, but limited, pay-outs" for
the "indeterminate opportunity for tort's riches").
'^••See. e.g., SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at V-4 ("[I]f institutions chose to fund
such a system with insurance, the premiums ascribable to the insurance could be paid from grant or
contract funds under eurrent department policies.").
' " 1 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-176 (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/
dO4261sp.pdf
'̂ * PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at Appendix IV.
^ '̂ See, e.g., Marwick, supra note 315, at 1854 ("One possible avenue for funding any
compensation for adverse events in clinical trials would be to set up a mechanism similar to the
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act.").
•'̂ ' See, e.g., THE LEWIN GRP., supra note 129, at 1 ("[T]o this day the only national standard for
no fault procedures and federal compensation guidelines is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
A c t . . . .").
' " Vaccine Program/Office of Special Masters, U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters (last visited Nov. 17, 2011)
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Those injured as a result of receiving certain compulsory childhood vaccines
may use the vaccine court to petition the federal government for monetary
damages.''^" To win an award, a claimant must present medical records that show
that a child developed one of several listed adverse events soon after vaccination.^^'
Compensation covers medical and legal expenses, loss of future earning capacity,
and up to $250,000 for pain and suffering. A death benefit of up to $250,000 is also
available.^''^ The compensation program is funded by a seventy-five cent surtax on
the purchase of each vaccine,"^ thereby adopting and implementing a system of risk-
spreading by which those actually vaccinated pay into a fund that compensates the
few who are injured by vaccination.''''"
A vaccine court-like compensation system satisfies several of the criteria set
forth above: like participants are treated alike, injured research participants receive
fair payment for the harm suffered, and the payments are disbursed more efficiently
than they are under the tort system. The vaccine court model does not satisfy several
of the remaining criteria. The vaccine court model pools the risk of all injuries,
making payments to those injured from a collective pot of money. While pooled risk
may be appropriate for vaccines—identifying which manufacturer produced the
vaccine that gave rise to injury could be unduly burdensome—such risk sharing is
not necessary for research and eliminates incentives for sponsors to manage or
mitigate risk.̂ ^^
An additional disadvantage is that the vaccine court model requires an entirely
new bureaucracy, and it is not clear that the political will necessary to create a
specialty court for compensating research-related injuries exists. The vaccine court
was established in a moment of political crisis during which many feared that large
tort awards would force all vaccine manufacturers out of the market.''* The political
circumstances surrounding compensation for research-related injury are not similarly
dire. For nearly four decades, national advisory committees have called for a system
[hereinafter Vaccine Program]; Statement on National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Before
the House Committee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Thomas E. Balbier, Jr., Director, Nat'l Vaccine Injury Comp. Program, U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs.), available at http;//www.hhs.gov/asl/ testify/t990928b.html ("42 percent of
petitions adjudicated under the Program have been awarded compensation. This compares to a
compensation rate of only 23 percent for those who file medical malpractice lawsuits through the
usual tort system. On average, it takes only two years to resolve claims and issue any appropriate
payments.").
^^" See, e.g.. Vaccine Program, supra note 329.
" ' THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE
UNDER THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 8 (2004), available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/OSM.Guidelines.pdf
'''Id at 4.
"^ See, e.g., Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3.
'''' Critiques of the vaccine court system generally relate to the fact that rates of compensation
have not been adjusted since implementation, and that the system is still more adversarial than
anticipated. See. e.g., Rob Henson, Inoculated Against Recovery: A Comparative Analysis of Vaccine
Injury Compensation in the United States and Great Britain, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 61, 89-92
(2007).
' " Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3.
''^ See, e.g., Scott, supra note 137, at 422. At the time, large jury awards had forced several
vaccine manufacturers to consider the potential costs of lawsuits; many concluded that they could no
longer afford to stay in business. Most vaccine manufacturers ceased production, and the last
remaining major manufacturer threatened to do so. The vaccine court was thus seen as a timely
solution to an imperiled supply of vaccines. Id.; Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 3.
RECOVERING FROM RESEARCH 51
to compensate those injured by research."' During that time, scandals emerged
revealing ethically impermissible or unreasonably risky research.'^^ None of this has
resulted in public clamoring for systemic reform. Given the lack of demonstrated
political will, the political system is unlikely to lead to the implementation of a
vaccine court-like system to compensate injured research participants.
Whether a vaccine court model could comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act and
the Adequacy of Appropriations Act is unclear."' The vaccine-court-implementing
statute imposes a fee on the sale of each vaccine, an identifiable transaction that
shifts the costs of the system back to the consumer of the vaccine.̂ ""* Unlike the
vaccine system, the research enterprise does not include an easily identifiable
transaction on which this fee may be levied. A fiat-rate, per-participant fee could
comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations Act
because the cost of compensation would be knowable at the outset of research. But,
other means of collecting fees may not comply. Whether such a system could sadsfy
the international requirements that sponsors of research agree to insure or indemnify
against research-related injury is also unclear.
3. Compensation Fund
A third no-fault compensation model that has been proposed is a compensation
fund similar to that of the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (the "9/11 Compensation Fund"), and
the BP Oil Spill Compensation Fund. These ftinds disburse money pooled from a
collective pot to a defined group of injured individuals. This is an approach that has
already been implemented as a way of compensating injured research participants.
Between 1945 and 1962, the U.S. government conducted nearly 200
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests across swaths of the Southwest.'''*' Years later,
many who were injured as a result of exposure to radiation filed class-action
lawsuits that were dismissed by the appellate courts.̂ "*^ Congress decided to provide
relief to those who were injured, and on October 5, 1990, passed the RECA.'''*^ The
Act implemented a flat-rate compensation model for those who contracted certain
diseases following exposure to radiation.'''*'* To receive compensation, claimants had
to show that they resided in an area with significant fallout from the nuclear testing
and that they had contracted a listed medical condition. '̂*̂  Claimants were not
" ' See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 46;
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43; SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE, supra note 77.
•'^'See, e.g., EMANUEL ET AL., supra note 9; Levine, supra note 1; Reverby, supra note 10;
Stephens, supra note 6.
" ' Compare Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l)(A) (2006), and Adequacy of
Appropriations Act, 41 U.S.C. § 1 l(a) (2006), with National Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-l to-34 (2006).
''"' Stephen D. Sugarman, Cases in Vaccine Court — Legal Battles over Vaccines and Autism,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1275 (2007), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMp078168.
'"' See Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), U.S. DEP 'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/torts/const/reca/about.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2011) [hereinafter
RECA].
'''Id
' "^2 U.S.C. §2210(2006).
'*" RECA, supra note Ml.
''' Id
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required to establish causation. Individuals who lived downwind of the test site and
subsequently became ill received flat-rate compensation of $50,000.'''*
A compensation fund has been implemented more recently in the aftermath of
9/11,''" In the 9/11 Compensation Fund, a large amount of money was appropriated
by the federal government out of which those injured could make a claim for money
damages. Kenneth Feinberg, appointed Special Master of the 9/11 Compensation
Fund, administered the ftind and made determinations about how money would be
paid out.'"* Calculations were made based on ftiture earning potential, presumed pain
and suffering, minus any collateral source of income.'"' An accepted offer could not
be appealed."" Families unhappy with the offer were able to appeal in a non-
adversarial, informal hearing to present their case however they wanted."' A similar
approach has been adopted to compensate those injured as a result of the BP oil
"^
Compensation funds offer many advantages and satisfy many of the criteria for
an ideal no-fault compensation system. All injured research participants are treated
alike, and money is distributed with maximum efficiency and minimum
administrative burden. One downside is that ñinded compensation systems do
require a new centralized bureaucracy. It is also unclear whether compensation ftinds
comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Adequacy of Appropriations Act. For
the same reasons as the vaccine court proposal, it is unclear whether a compensation
fund could satisfy international requirements that sponsors of research agree to
insure or indemnify against research-related injury.
Feinberg argued that future compensation funds "should provide the same
amount of compensation for all eligible claimants"'" because different amounts
"promoted inefficiency and delay.""" Flat-rate compensation does not satisfy several
important requirements, most notably that injured research participants be made
whole for the injuries they suffer. For some research participants, compensation of
$50,000—adjusted upward for inflation—is far more than is needed; for others, it is
far from adequate. A flat-rate compensation system may be needed when
compensating a large group, the cost and cause of whose injuries cannot be
accurately measured; it is not necessary for research-related injuries—injuries
incurred by known and well-monitored participants. Last, a flat-rate compensation
system creates odd incentives for research sponsors to manage and mitigate risk;
researchers have strong flnancial incentives not to injure anyone, but once a research
participant is injured, researchers have no financial incentive to minimize any
resulting injury.
^•"September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,236 (Mar. 13,




^" About the Fund, BP CLAIMS FUND ASSISTANCE (July 21, 2010),
http://www.thebpclaimsfund.com/.
•'" Kenneth R. Feinberg, 7V¡e September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 32 LITIGATION 14, 17
(2006).
"Ud
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4. Personal Insurance
A final model for compensating injured research participants is a variant ofthe
system that is already in place: compensation through an individual's personal health
insurance. In this variafion, injured research participants would file claims with their
own insurers. The individual's own insurance then pays the claim—generally for
medical care, perhaps for financial injuries if mandated statutorily—on a no-fault
basis.
A personal insurance compensation model satisfies some of the criteria set forth
above: such a system is efficient, requires no new bureaucracy, and by shifting the
burden of injury back to participants, does not conflict with the Anti-Deficiency Act
and the Adequacy of Appropriations Act.
A personal insurance compensation model fails in several key ways. First, and
perhaps most fundamentally, like injured research participants are not treated alike.
The level of compensation depends on the particular insurance that an injured
research participant has. Under this system, uninsured research participants will not
receive any compensation.'^^ Second, the system provides no economic incentives
for research institutions to manage and mitigate the risks of research. Last, this
system clearly does not satisfy the international requirement that sponsors of
research agree to insure or indemnify against research-related injury. These key
failures render this proposal insufficient to address the current inadequacies of the
tort system for compensating injured research parficipants.
All proposed modifications offer some improvement over the current system in
terms of ensuring that injured research participants receive compensation. Although
it arguably has the most to recommend it independently, the insurance/self-insurance
requirement has a critical additional advantage over other proposals: it brings our
laws into accord with those in the rest of the world, and readies U.S.-sponsored
multinafional research for cross-border approval.
C. PROPOSED PARAMETERS
This Article endorses a no-fault compensation system using an insurance/self-
insurance requirement. In addition to satisfying many of the criteria set forth above,
an insurance/self-insurance requirement could bring U.S. law into accord with the
laws of the rest of the world. An insurance/self-insurance requirement also
appropriately retains an element of risk deterrence.
The proposal set forth below borrows procedurally from various no-fault
compensation systems around the world, but modifies and adapts these policies to
work best with systems already in place for reporting research-related injuries. The
substantive provisions of the proposal are meant to provide a framework that can be
implemented in countries around the world, permitting fiexibility and intra-country
differences when they do not disproportionately burden multinational research.
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry promulgated guidelines
on compensation for research injuries"^ that have been modified and adopted by a
number of diverse countries—including the United Kingdom, South Africa,
" ' The Patient Proteetion and Affordable Care Act may alter the number of uninsured people
living in the United States. MOSES & SINGER L L P , supra note 141.
"'^ THE ASS'N OF THE BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., CLINICAL TRIAL COMPENSATION GUIDELINES
§ 1.2 (Jan. 1, 1994), available at http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-work/library/guidelines/Pages/et-
compensation.aspx.
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Australia, New Zealand,'" and, de facto, Singapore."* These guidelines illustrate
both that compatible systems can be implemented in a number of diverse countries,
and that guidelines can be promulgated and accepted by private industry—i.e., those
who have traditionally been most resistant to compensation mandates.
1. Process
, This proposal requires that sponsors of research compensate injured research
participants. As a necessary precondition to getting research approved by a research
ethics committee, research sponsors would be required to check a box certifying that
they had made arrangements to compensate injured research participants. Research
sponsors could choose whether to compensate through third-party insurance, or
whether to self-insure and compensate injured research participants directly."' To
the extent research sponsors under-insure, they will be required to compensate
injured research participants directly.
A modified version of the adverse event reporting system triggers the
compensation mechanism. Today, most countries require that investigators report
adverse events arising from research to authorities.'*" These reports detail the type of
injury and whether, in the investigator's opinion, the injury was likely attributable to
the research intervention. Under this proposal, the flling of an adverse event report
for research injuries would trigger institutional compensation mechanisms.
As under the current adverse event reporting system, the investigator would
make an initial determination as to the likelihood of the injury being related to
research. The investigator is generally qualifled to make an initial determination
because he or she often has the most detailed knowledge about the research
intervention and often has the most specialized knowledge about any underlying
conditions being studied. The investigator may be self-interested in flnding injuries
unrelated to the research, which counsels against relying exclusively on the
investigator's assessment. Though invesdgators would be expected to deal fairly in
making their assessment, the initial assessments would be subject to review and
injured research participants would be entitled to the procedural safeguards of notice
and opportunity to be heard.
An injury found by the investigator to be related to the research triggers the
institution's compensation mechanism. The injured research participant would then
be given a time frame within which to provide documentation of unreimbursed
medical costs and flnancial harms arising from the injury. The institution should
make a settlement offer that covers these documented losses. If an injured research
participant accepts payment under the compensation program, the payment fully
^" Thatte et al., supra note 284, at 133.
"* SING. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra 285, § 16(a) ("Most of the centres themselves or the
sponsors of the trial follow the guidelines of the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry
(ABPI) on compensation for adverse events resulting from participation in a clinical trial.").
" ' Karen Moe, Director and Assistant Vice Provost For Research, Univ. of Wash., Presentation
to the President's Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (Nov. 17, 2011), available at
http://bioethics.gov/cms/meeting-seven (noting that the University of Washington performed this
analysis and concluded that self-insurance was the more cost-effective option).
"'" For a discussion of various adverse event reporting systems, see WORLD ALLIANCE FOR
PATIENT SAFETY, WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING
AND LEARNING SYSTEMS (2005); INT'L CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION OF TECHNICAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARM. FOR HUMAN USE, MAINTENANCE OF THE ICH
GUIDELINE ON CLINICAL SAFETY DATA MANAGEMENT: DATA ELEMENTS FOR TRANSMISSION OF
INDIVIDUAL CASE SAFETY REPORTS E 2 B ( R 2 ) (Feb. 5, 2001).
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extinguishes further legal claims. If the injured research participant does not accept
the offer, the participant may proceed to court.^*' For the reasons set forth in Part III,
many tort law claims arising from research injuries are unlikely to succeed. Because
of the limitafions of the tort system, the protections of the compensation system must
be sufficiently robust.
To the extent an investigator concludes that the injury did not arise from
research, the injured research participant must receive notificadon of the initial
assessment and be provided an opportunity to present documentary or in-person
evidence stating otherwise. Each institution must designate a committee that can
review the claim and any additional evidence presented. This task can be delegated
either to the IRB (already presented with adverse event reports), the Data Safety
Monitoring Board (already tasked with monitoring safety), or a standing committee
within the entity. The committee will review the evidence presented and make an
offer upon finding that the injury arose from research.
The institutional evaluation procedure must be set forth in clear language in the
informed consent form. Institutions may also choose to appoint a representative to
assist injured research participants in presenting their claims for compensation.
Claims that cannot be settled through this process may proceed to litigation or to
arbitration by an independent body, as required by local law.'*^
Claims must be brought within a period of time after the injury, and within a
period of dme following the conclusion of research. This de facto statute of
limitations means that some late-filing injured research participants will be denied
access to no-fault compensation. This concern is particularly serious for research
participants with injuries that emerge much later. To the extent the research sponsor
is still available to make this determination at the time the injury is discovered and
can make a determination with minimal additional burden, the research participant
shall be entitled to review in accordance with the institution's no-fault compensation
system. The injured research participant would still have the option to bring suit,
subject to the limitations discussed in Part III.
2. Research Covered
Other countries and other proposals have carved out two types of research as
being exempt from insurance/self-insurance requirements: minimal risk research''
and therapeutic research.^*'' For the reasons set forth below, this proposal would not
carve out these types of research.
^" O'Connell & Linehan, supra note 317, at 134.
^'^See, e.g., Ass'N OF THE BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., supra note 356, § 4.3 ("In any case where
the company concedes that a payment should be made to a patient but there exists a difference of
opinion between company and patient as to the appropriate level of compensation, it is recommended
that the company agrees to seek at its own cost . . . the opinion of a mutually acceptable independent
expert, and that his opinion should be given substantial weight by the company . . . .").
''" See, e.g., Netherlands Decree of 23 June 2003 containing mies for compulsory insurance in medical
research involving human subjects, art. 4(1), available at http://www.ccmo.nl/download/verzekeringsbesluit
2003-eng.pdf ("If the committee responsible for assessing the trial protocol in question believes the clinical
trial represents no risk to the subjects, at the sponsor's request it may, upon its approval of the protocol,
exempt the sponsor from the obligation to take out insurance."); EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 263,
§ 2.4.2 (considering "[r]emoving insurance/indemnisation requirements for low-risk trials: This policy
option would remove the insurance requirement for clinical trials whieh typically pose a low risk for trial
subjects").
' " See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 132-35.
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The first class of research that has been carved out from insurance/self-
insurance requirements is minimal risk research. The primary argument for
exempting minimal risk research is that requiring sponsors to purchase insurance or
self-insure is thought to be onerous in relation to the low probability that anyone will
actually suffer injury. ^̂ ^ Some research is classified as minimal risk because it
carries only a remote chance of causing serious injury. But this low probability does
not ensure that no one will become injured, and does not eliminate the moral
imperative to compensate those who do become injured by research. If the remote
possibility of injuries occurs, those injured by research should not be left
uncompensated. Accordingly, even sponsors of minimal risk research must agree to
purchase insurance or agree to compensate injured research participants directly. The
expectation is that sponsors of most minimal risk research—particularly
sociological, survey, or other non-interventional studies—will choose to self-insure
rather than purchase insurance, thereby fulfilling the moral obligation at no cost.
The second class of research that has been exempted from compensation
requirements, or subject to lowered compensation requirements, is therapeutic
research.^^^ The rationale behind exempting therapeutic research is two-fold. First,
because participants enroll in research in the hopes of obtaining a benefit, they are
acting in a self-interested manner, or so may not have the same ethical claim for
compensation if injury befalls them. But the mere prospect of a benefit does not
undermine the fact that research participants are taking on additional risk in a way
that benefits society.
Second, some have suggested that injured research subjects should not be
compensated if they were injured as a result of participating in therapeutic research
because it could be difficult to determine whether the injury was caused by the
research or by the participant's underlying disease.^^' In at least some therapeutic
research trials, such as the FIAU trial discussed in the Introduction, the injury can be
pretty easily attributed to the research. It would, in fact, be strange if the injured or
killed FIAU participants could not receive compensation for their injuries simply
because they enrolled in therapeutic research, when the injury they suffered bore no
relation to the underlying disease, and was far in excess of what they could have
expected from their disease. Although there may be cases in which determining
whether the injury was caused by the research or by the underlying disease is more
difficult, this determination is a question of fact and can be evaluated much like
other questions of fact.
Compensation should be provided to all injured research participants, regardless
of whether the research was therapeutic or not, provided that the injury exceeds that
which would reasonably occur due to any underlying illness or treatment associated
with the disease.^**
The European Union is currently reconsidering its decision not to exempt minimal risk
research. EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 263, § 2.4.2.
"*See, e.g., Gainotti & Petrini, supra note 120, at 4 (noting that France has different standards
for therapeutic and nontherapeutic research).
'" See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 132-35.
*̂* This approach is consistent with the opinions of the 1977 Task Force. See, e.g., SECRETARY'S
TASK FORCE, supra note 77, at VI-9 (concluding that participants in both therapeutic and non-
therapeutic research should be entitled to no-fault compensation, provided that injury is defined
narrowly).
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3. Compensable Injuries
Defining when a research injury is compensable is undeniably more complex
than defining a compensable workers' compensation claim,'*' or even defining a
compensable vaccine injury.'™ Although defining a compensable research-related
injury is difficult, it is not impossible.
Defining a compensable event involves a two-pronged determination: first,
whether the injury is of a type that is entitled to compensation; and second, whether
the circumstances under which the injury occurred merit compensadon. As to the
first determination, only injuries that result in documentable financial harms are
entitled to compensation.'^' Minor injuries, such as bleeding or bruising, should be
dealt with on-site and on-the-spot. In the context of therapeutic research,
compensation is due when a measurable injury occurs that is in excess of what
would have occurred had the underlying disease been treated with the standard of
care.
The second determination pertains to the circumstances in which injuries should
be compensated. The simple answer is that injuries should be compensated that on
balance of the probabilides, arise from research."^ Compensation may be due even
when injuries arise from aspects of the research other than the particular medicinal
product being tested.'^' AbduUahi pardcipants who were in fact injured as a result of
receiving a deliberately low dose of the comparator drug should be entitled to no-
fault compensation even though their injury did not arise from the intervention being
tested, because they were injured in excess of what likely would have occurred had
they received the standard of care."'* Compensation may also be due for injuries
arising from procedures necessary for research but not treatment. Compensation may
be reduced by comparative negligence to the extent the participants' own negligence
contributed to the injury.'^^
4. Types of Compensation
Injured research participants are entitled to compensation for the otherwise
uncompensated costs associated with death and serious physical and mental injury.
In accordance with many of the compensation systems in place in other countries.
''•' The only question presented in the workers' compensation system "is whether or not the
injury 'arose out of and in the course of employment' . . . ." O'Connell & Linehan, supra note 317, at
132 (intemal citations omitted).
"° PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 82, at 69.
" ' Using serious adverse event reporting as a trigger appropriately confines the compensation
mechanism to non-trivial injuries. See. e.g., Ass'N OF THE BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., supra note 356,
§ 1.4 ("Compensation should only be paid for the more serious injury of an enduring and disabling
character . . . and not for temporary pain or discomfort or less serious or curable complaints.");
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 129 (limiting benefits to "nontrivial bodily injuries or death
as a result of their participation in covered research"). Research-related injuries that are not serious,
e.g., bleeding or bruising from a blood draw, should be treated on-site. These injuries would not
generally otherwise be compensable in court. See. e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 81
("For subjects with minor, short-lived injuries (who constitute a large proportion of injured subjects),
the provision of free, on-the-spot medical care dispenses with any need for formal 'compensation' for
research injuries.").
™ See, e.g., Ass'N OF THE BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., supra note 356, § 1.2.
™See. e.g., id. §3.2.
"* See supra Part III.
' " See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 129 ("Benefits should be reduced or
eliminated when injury results from the failure ofthe subject reasonably to conform to the provisions
ofthe research.") (emphasis added).
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the United States could—but needs not—consider compensating documented and
demonstrable lost wages and loss of future earnings. As is the case in vaccine courts
and the 9/11 Compensation Fund, a death beneflt should be paid to the estate of
participants who die as a result of participating in research. Institutions should have
discretion to compensate for pain and suffering, but should not be required to do
so,"* Compensation received through collateral sources of payment—including life
insurance proceeds, pensions, and workers' compensation payments—satisfy the
requirement that participants be made whole,'"
Some countries have implemented payment caps limiting payments per
participant and per clinical trial."* If payments due are high enough to hit payment
caps, payments to individuals are reduced proportionally. " ' These caps deny
compensation to injured research participants. It is entirely possible that payment
caps would permit those injured and killed by the FIAU research to recover only a
small proportion of the actual costs of their injury, unfairly shifting the flnancial
burden back to the injured research participants. This proposal does not recommend
implementing a payment cap.
Some countries have implemented monetary thresholds that must be met before
claims for compensation can be brought.'*" These thresholds are implemented to
limit the number of claims, thereby reducing the cost of compensation systems.
These thresholds also deny some injured research participants the possibility of
being made whole. Before any monetary threshold can be put in place, empirical
data about the types and number of claims that would be foreclosed should be
obtained. This proposal suggests that compensation be provided without regard to
thresholds, but that the possibility of instituting a threshold should be reevaluated in
three to five years.
5. Cross-Border Applicability
Each country should be allowed to determine the amounts that must be paid to
the country's own injured research participants. Research conducted abroad must
comply with the compensation limits set forth by the host country. For countries that
do not require compensation, it is strongly urged that sponsors agree to compensate
"* These parameters are in line with compensation systems of other nations and with the
eompensation provided by other U.S. no-fault compensation systems. See. e.g.. The Danish Liability
for Damages Act, pt. I (2007) (Den.), available at http://www.patientforsikringen.dk/en/Love-og-
Regler/Lov-om-klage-og-erstatningsadgang/Behandlingsskader.aspx (compensating for personal
injury, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, permanent injury, and loss of earning capacity, among
other areas); Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 (amended 2007), pt. 2,
§ 26(1) (N.Z.) (compensating for the death of a person, physical injuries suffered by a person, and
mental injury); BRAZIL COMPENSATION, supra note 260, at art. II.8 (compensating injuries to the
"physical, psychic, moral, intellectual, social, cultural, or spiritual dimensions of the human subjeet").
" ' This is how the 9/11 Compensation Fund was implemented. Feinberg, supra note 353, at 15.
" 'See, e.g., Danish Act on the Right to Complain and Receive Compensation within the Health
Service (2009), pt. 4, § 50 (Den.), available at http://www.patientforsikringen.dk/en/Love-og-
Regler/Lov-om-klage-og-erstatningsadgang/L£egemiddelskader.aspx (capping damages to individual
injured research participants at DKK5 million per injured person, approximately one million U.S.
dollars); Medical Research (Human Subjects) Compulsory Insurance Decree, Stb. 2003, p. 66,
art. 3(l)(Neth.).
(capping insurance payments at €450,000 per subject and €3,500,000 per clinical trial).
" ' See, e.g.. Medical Research (Human Subjects) Compulsory Insurance Decree, supra note 378,
at 66, art. 3(1).
'""See, e.g., Danish Act on the Right to Complain and Receive Compensation within the Health
Serviee, supra note 378, at pt. 4, § 46 (permitting claims that exceed DKK3000, approximately five
hundred U.S. dollars).
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injured research participants at the levels required by the nearest neighboring
country that requires compensation, or at levels mandated by countries with
comparable per capita income levels.
While it is hoped that countries would begin to harmonize the amount and types
of compensation required, harmonization is not necessary. Because sponsors must
carry sufficient insurance or agree to self-insure to cover any costs not covered by
insurance, sponsors could make independent assessments based on the countries in
which they will conduct trials about the amount of insurance necessary.
Procedures must be set forth that ensure that injured international research
participants can contest any adjudication of their claim. Each country would be
permitted to decide the form this resolution should take. In countries that require that
injured research participants not waive their legal rights, injured research
participants should be allowed to bring suit in court, and sponsors of research should
consent to be sued; other countries could appoint an independent body as an official
arbitrator. If sponsors of research agree to comply with the compensation
requirements of host countries, the current battle over complying with many national
regimes could be eliminated.
6. Implementation
Implementing this proposal in the United States would require either
modifications to the federal regulations governing research or voluntary
participation. If voluntary compliance is not forthcoming, U.S. regulations would be
modified to require that sponsors of research agree to purchase insurance or self-
insure to compensate injured research participants in accordance with local law.̂
Second, the adverse event reporting already in place in the United States must be
modified to require that any reported event triggers the evaluation of claims in the
manner set forth above. Third, the regulations should be modified to require that
research institutions set forth an internal process for reviewing decisions about the
relatedness of injury to research.
While these regulatory modifications are sufficient for both privately conducted
research and federally funded research conducted by grant recipients, the situation is
more complex with regards to federally conducted research. The Adequacy of
Appropriations and Anti-Deficiency Acts have been interpreted to limit the federal
government's ability to compensate injured research participants directly; potential
liabilities could exceed amounts congressionally appropriated.^*^ Except in limited
circumstances, government appropriations law and policies generally limit the
federal government's ability to purchase insurance in the absence of a statutory grant
of authority. ^̂ ^ Government agencies may therefore need a statutory grant of
authority to purchase private insurance to compensate injured research participants,
and may need to look to statutory workarounds if the institutions under-insure.^ '*
*̂' Those institutions with sufficient funds will be permitted to indemnify injured research
participants. See, e.g., Suz Redfeam, Clinical Trial Insurance (Aug. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.clinpage.com/article/clinical_trial_insurance/ ("[M]ost big pharmaceutical companies
don't buy clinical trial insurance. Some may instead have a dedicated risk management division on the
premises. Or they know that their cash reserves are enough to handle any settlements that need to be
made.").
*̂̂  See, e.g., Jamie Summers, Legal and Practical Barriers to a No-Fault Compensation Program
for Research Related Infuries (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
' " OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 325, at 4-164.
"'' There are exceptions to this general policy that, if applicable, would allow govemment
agencies to purchase private insurance without a statutory grant of authority. See id. at 4-180.
60 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 3 8 NO. 1 2012
D. RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE CRITIQUES
A number of critiques of implementing a system of compensation for research
injuries suggest that no system should be implemented at all.'*' These critiques
include arguments that implementing a no-fault compensation system would be too
costly, that the data is insufficient to show that compensation is needed, and that
now is not the time to implement a no-fault compensation system given the extent to
which our health insurance system is in fiux.'^* For the reasons set forth below, these
critiques are insufficient to overcome the ethical imperative to compensate injured
research participants.
1. Costs
The primary critique of implementing no-fault compensation for research
injuries is its presumed cost.'^^ Many worry that the costs of implementing no-fault
compensation would divert ftinds away ft-om important research.'^* Though there is
only limited data on the scope and cost of research-related injuries,'^' what data
there are suggest that compensating injured research participants should not be
financially burdensome.
Data from a 1976 survey conducted by the NIH, the most comprehensive data
on research injuries in the United States, suggest that research-related injuries occur
only infrequently. The 1976 survey data suggest that only 3.7 percent of all research
participants sustained any injury. Of these, 79.2 percent had trivial injuries, while
only 3.7 percent were permanently disabled, and only 0.9 percent died.''" More
recent data from European countries similarly indicate a low frequency of research-
related injuries."' Data from the European Union suggest that the financial cost of
'*' See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 89, at 284-85.
'"• Id. See also text in Parts V.D. 1 -D.3.
^" See. e.g., Resnik, supra note 89, at 284 ("A major reason no-fault systems are not popular in the
United States is that institutions and sponsors do not want to bear the burden of financing these plans ")
™ See, e.g., W.
'^' See, e.g., iNST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 191 ("The main impediment to the implementation
of a compensation program for research-related injuries in the United States is that, despite decades of
discussion and studies by a number of federal commissions, there remains little quantitative
information regarding the number and severity of potentially compensable injuries and about the costs
of implementing compensation programs.").
™ See. e.g., Scott, supra note 137, at 420.
' " In an unidentified member state with approximately 200-1000 clinical trial applications per
year, only fourteen claims for compensation were granted over a period of nine years. In Finland, out
of almost 300,000 trial participants, the Finnish Patient Insurance Centre and the Finnish
Pharmaceutical Insurance Pool received only nineteen requests for compensation between 2005 and
2010; only four led to compensation. Denmark received only twenty-seven claims for compensation
over a period often years. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 263, at 23. It is important to note that
data from Europe create an imperfect comparison; many European countries have national healthcare,
under which medical bills are generally covered. Additionally, some of the plans, including the
German plan, do not provide compensation for pain and suffering. Nevertheless, given that the lack of
empirical data has been used to prevent implementation of compensation systems in the United States,
it is also important to use the empirical data available.
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compensating research-related injuries is quite low,^'^ and that the costs of insurance
per patient per annum are also quite low. '̂̂
More importantly, agreeing to compensate injured research participants does not
itself create new costs; rather it shifts the burden of those costs from the injured
research participant to the research sponsor.
2. Not Actually a Problem?
Others have argued that given the relative infrequency of research-related
injuries, perhaps the problem is insufficiently serious to warrant any solution.^''* As
set forth above, there is only limited data on the scope and frequency of research-
related injury, and what data exist are somewhat lacking. We are altogether unsure
of the extent to which injured research participants bear the financial consequences
of research injuries. Some might argue that if even one injured research participant is
forced to bear the financial consequences of the research injury, that itself is a wrong
that should be righted.^'^
But a practical response is more straightforward. Under this proposal, sponsors
of research can choose to self-insure rather than purchasing commercial insurance. If
the problem of research injuries is much smaller than anticipated or feared, the cost
of compensating those who become injured will be quite low.
3. Now Is Not the Time
The third argument against implementing a no-fault compensation system is that
the healthcare insurance system is currently in flux, and that it would be better to
wait and assess the impact of current health reform efforts before layering an
additional system on top of our current one. But our health system has been
undergoing systemic change for much of the forty years that the possibility of
compensating injured research participants has been discussed.''^* Waiting until the
system is settled may take years, and possibly decades. Current reform efforts,
moreover, are aimed at ensuring that more Americans are covered by health
"^ Denmark, at the high end of the scale, paid €550,000 over a period of ten years to injured
research participants, or €55,000 per year. Relative to Denmark's annual research budget of €385
million per year, the cost of compensating injured research participants is 0.01 percent of the health
research budget. See DANISH RESEARCH AGENCY, FIGURES FOR RESEARCH 2005 (Jan. 2006),
available at http://en.fi.dk/publications/2006/figures-for-research-statistics-2005/figures-for-research-
statistics-2005.pdf (showing the research expenditures of Denmark to be DKK2.846 billion).
'^' The cost of insurance per patient per annum in Europe ranges from a low of €14.50 in
Belgium, to a high of €75 in France and Germany. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 263, at 23.
Relative to the other costs of conducting a biomédical research trial, these costs are negligible—even
for very large trials. Some data suggest that the costs of purchasing insurance may be less than the
costs of compensating research-related injuries directly. In an unidentified member state, the total
amount of compensation paid out in fourteen claims over nine years was €43,000. The administrative
cost for the insurers was approximately €38,000, and the total cost for the policy was approximately
€235,000. Id.
'"" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 65-80; NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,, supra note
81, at 123-25.
' " PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 43, at 80 ("Although the evidence consistently suggests that the
incidence of serious injury is small, nonetheless, it is clear that at least some subjects sustain injuries as a
result of their participation in federally funded or regulated research. For them, ... the question of
compensation is real and of immediate importance.").
''*' Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate About the Affordable Care Act,
80 UMKC L. Rev. 45,48-49 (2011).
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insurance.'^' As Americans increasingly receive health insurance coverage, research
participants should also be increasingly covered, which will presumably result in
fewer instances in which injured research participants alone bear the financial costs
of research injuries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past half-century, biomédical research has become increasingly
regulated, with the goal of increasing participant protection. One area in which
protections for research participants have fallen critically short is caring for research
participants who become injured as a result of participating in research.
Over the past four decades, U.S. advisory committees have repeatedly
concluded that injured research participants are entitled to compensation for any
injuries suffered as a result of their participation in research. These committees have
noted the inadequacy of the tort system and recommended implementation of no-
fault compensation. But they have offered no concrete proposals and have taken no
steps to implement systematic compensation. Accordingly, the United States has
continued to rely on the tort system to provide compensation for research-related
injuries.
Changes in the legal landscape and the global research landscape make
continued reliance on the tort system morally indefensible and an impediment to
U.S. research conducted abroad. Recent decisions highlight the inadequacy of the
tort system; the tort system poses challenges unique to research participants that are
difficult to overcome and insurmountable for certain classes of research participants,
resulting in substantial unfairness. In the past decade, the research enterprise has
become increasingly global, and many ofthe countries that sponsor, host, or conduct
substantial amounts of research have required that injured research participants
receive systematic compensation. By not requiring compensation, the United States
has become a moral outlier and risks having its intemational research embargoed,
delaying potential medical advances.
This Article recommends implementing no-fault compensation for participants
injured as a result of participating in research. Having reviewed a number of no-fault
compensation systems, this Article proposes an insurance/self-insurance requirement
that builds on research reporting systems already in place. This proposal can be
implemented in the United States and in countries around the world to help
harmonize various national compensation systems. This proposal satisfies the moral
obligation owed to injured research participants and more equitably and effectively
makes those injured by research whole.
^" Id. at 52 ("The [Patient Protection and Affordable Care] Act promises to extend health care
coverage to millions of people. Health care coverage will be made available to many not now insured.").
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